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Rural Development and Agricultural Policy

In

Central Western Zambia

The case of Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme

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Masters Thesis
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To the memory of my mother Tsehainesh Demelew and grandmother Chekolech
Takele

[**Onderaan komt een foto van mangoverkoopsters**]

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Amstelveen, December 1994
Kassa Hailu

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Map 1. Political Map of Zambia

Map 2. Kaoma district and wards of Kaoma district.

Source: Adaptive research planning team, Mongu. Western province, July, 1993.

3. Ethnicity and locality in Zambia.

Source: Religious change in Zambia, W. van Binsbergen.

[Kassa Hailu, main text of thesis]

I. Introduction

This thesis has been written as an academic requirement for the study of Cultural Anthropology/Sociology of Development. It is based upon field work that was conducted in Zambia from October 1993 until the end of January 1994. The materials for this thesis were collected in the Kaoma district and in Mongu, the capital of Western Province, from the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, Co-operative Unions, and lending institutions. In addition to my personal observations, I have also gathered data by interviewing different categories of farmers and officials in Western Province and in Lusaka the country's capital.

I shall concentrate on the social responses to agricultural change in rural communities. I shall do this by discussing the case of agricultural change and development in Kaoma district as the result of the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. The area delimited for my research was Nkeyema and the surrounding villages of Kahare's Chiefdom. Although maize seeds and plough methods were introduced in the 1930s in the district, important agricultural changes have occurred in the Nkeyema area only in recent years. From 1971 onwards mechanisation (use of tractors, machinery, etc.) and plough methods for cultivation have steadily replaced the traditional ash cultivation in Nkeyema and its surrounding villages. During this period, tobacco and hybrid maize were introduced as cash crops and were grown successfully by 'assisted tenant farmers' and 'family farmers' under the supervision of the Tobacco Board of Zambia (TBZ). The assisted tenant farmers were the most active group. This group belonged to categories that were expected beforehand to realise the kind of profit that would admit them into a large-scale commercial group.

Agricultural development in the Nkeyema area has brought about an overall increase in prosperity and has led to increased capital investment, especially by migrants from other ethnic groups and retired officials from towns hoping to benefit from the expanding economy. Currently, there are many diesel-engine grinding mills serving the community and the surrounding area. Several locally-owned pick-up trucks and lorries make trips to the district capital and other towns in the province and hundreds of bicycles are used by the community, not only as means of transportation, but also to transport agricultural goods to the market or to the farm.

The aim of this thesis is to attempt to document the kinds of socio-economic changes that have taken place and to indicate the factors responsible for the emergence of various new social forms. I shall try to discuss the move from a subsistence agriculture to one where cash cropping and the use of plough and tractor have become increasingly important, which in turn has led to certain changes in the organisation of labour and attitudes towards land-holding. The presence of the Nkeyema tobacco scheme in the area has paved the way for the acceptance of a more settled form of agriculture. I shall try to examine which group or category of the population were able to exploit the new economic opportunities that were made available through the introduction of new farming methods and cash-crop production.

After this introduction, I begin with the theoretical background of my thesis. Chapter 3 deals with the history of Zambia. Chapter 4 contains background material in the form of theories of development. The organisational capabilities and constraints of development bureaucracies are very crucial to understand the context of large-scale agricultural organisations (Coward 1980, Chambers 1983, Ellis 1992). The stagnation of agricultural production, famine, political instability and civil wars in many developing countries are more or less the basic problems that the contemporary world is facing. Social scientists have attempted to understand and explain these problems. They try to give explanations and offer their own development options. Many books have been published, articles written and various theories have been introduced. Nevertheless, one still faces problems in identifying the explanatory of those theories and especially their applicability to the situation in developing countries. The absence of a clear methodology and the vagueness of the term 'development' are part of the problems in the study of development. Attention will be given to various development theories in this chapter.

Chapter 5 illustrates the socio-economic and political development of Kaoma district. It will be difficult to talk about the Nkoya people alone without mentioning the influence of the Lozi (the dominant ethnic group, politically as well as economically, in Western Province) upon them. Before colonial rule the Lozi had control over central-western Zambia for about a century. The situation has not yet changed even after independence. Central issues in this chapter include the position of Nkoya ethnic groups

during and after the colonial period, their relations with other ethnic groups and the place and role of Nkoya chiefs in Kaoma district. This chapter also focuses on the economic and political developments in Zambia as a whole. The nature of the state and the role that it plays within the socio-economic and political system is also critical. After about three decades of power monopolisation in a one party-state, multi-party democratic elections were held in October 1991. Certain changes have taken place, including political and economic reforms. I shall try to discuss the recent economic and political developments in the country.

Chapter 6 focuses attention on the agricultural development in Kaoma district, and particularly in Kahare's Chiefdom. The introduction of mechanised farming systems has altered the traditional value of labour, permitting or demanding new recruitment strategies and the fundamental change or transformation from non-commodity to commodity production, together with a new form of networks of relationships. On the basis of the gathered data, I shall try to discuss the agricultural situation before and after the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. The socio-economic life of the villagers and the role played by Co-operative Unions and lending institutions for agricultural purposes and their methods of inputs distribution will also receive attention. The analysis also reviews the co-ordination between the development bodies, that exist at the government, provincial, district, and local level, and the outcome of planning implementation.

Chapter 7 briefly analyses the role that the Tobacco Board of Zambia played through its branch, the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, as a tool for fostering socio-economic development in the Kaoma district. It then goes into an indepth analysis of various categories of farmers (assisted tenant farmers, family farmers and villagers) and of the services that were provided by the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme management. The assisted tenant farmers were recruited from all over the country and were sent to an agricultural college for two years. The majority of the family farmers were recruited from Kaoma district. Particular emphasis will be placed on how the macro-structure and policy of TBZ fit into with the micro-structure of the household and local community in the district. This chapter also focuses on the patterns of labour in farming, and on communications between the farmers and the tobacco scheme management.

Chapter 8 is a summary of the most important points of this thesis. It concludes with an overview of Zambia's experiences in socio-economic and political developments.

II. The theoretical background

As a student of Cultural Anthropology/ Sociology of Development I concentrated on subjects mainly dealing with rural development, agricultural policy and developmental problems. Before I went to the field, I wrote a research proposal under the supervision of professor Wim van Binsbergen about agricultural development in central-western Zambia and the impact of a large-scale agricultural project (the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme) on the local population. I studied the history of the area and the people, their origins in the valley, their political, economic, and ethnic history.

During my studying period as a student at the Free university of Amsterdam I was able to attend lectures and a seminar at the Agricultural University of Wageningen, Department of Sociology of Rural Development. The subjects were given by Prof. Jan Douwe van der Ploeg 'Sociologie van de boerenproductie' en 'Agrarische sociologie', by Dr. Alberto Arce 'Social Diversity, Environment and Rural Development'. I also followed a research seminar on 'Globalisation and Localisation' which was chaired by Prof. Norman Long. All these courses have inspired me a lot. I came to know more about agricultural development and rural development problems. I also benefited from the book of Dr. Han Seur (1992) which has increased my reflection on socio-cultural perceptions and the theoretical importance of social diversity and differential local responses in rural development.

Only M. Nelson-Richards has conducted research in the area on the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, in 1976. He published his research together with other field researches in Nepal and Zanzibar in 1988. His book has contributed to my preparations in studying the specific case of the Tobacco Board of Zambia and its branch, the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. Nelson-Richards studied the role played by the Tobacco Board of Zambia and the various participants in the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. His conclusion was that the tobacco scheme did not profit the target groups: the family farmers, the assisted tenant farmers and the indigenous people. The beneficiaries were according to him, the native bourgeoisie and the capitalists who controlled the international market (Nelson-Richards 1988).

Many other scholars have also demonstrated the failure of large-scale agricultural projects in many developing countries. The 'Green Revolution' in India and Indonesia for example, has primarily benefited the well-to-do farmers. (Chambers 1983, Harris 1987, Husken [**check Hüsken**] 1988, and Ellis 1992). Agricultural transformation obviously risks the virtual destruction of small peasant holdings. Purely technological solutions have failed to achieve their intended purpose because of the failure to take into account other and equally important parts of socio-cultural systems. I was curious to know the socio-economic, political and cultural outcomes of the mechanisation of agriculture, and cash-crop farming and I hoped to be able to provide answers to questions such as: did the introduction of agricultural technologies in Kaoma district lead to an increased dependence upon outside agencies, did the adoption of new technologies tend to reinforce the patterns of socio-economic differentiation or have new ones been generated, or have they led to a further marginalisation of the rural poor in the region?

The initial aim of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme was partly to mechanise the traditional agriculture and also to enhance the participation of the people in the area through the introduction of new seeds, new machines, fertilisers, and training to the traditional farmers who would want to participate in modern agriculture with the assistance of the tobacco scheme management at Nkeyema. Another theoretical question was, therefore: how external factors, such as the government and public organisations (farmers associations, co-operatives, and lending institutions) are mediated and at the same time transformed by internal structures and processes.

There is a body of literature about the peasant societies in developing countries. In discussing the questions about the processes leading to socio-economic differentiation within the local peasantries and the motivations behind, to engaging them in new and different socioeconomic relations, various models have been developed by social scientists to explore these questions. (Migdal 1974, Scott 1976, Popkin 1979, Hyden 1986,1987). I shall return to these theoretical problems when I discuss the analysis of various development theories.

2.1 The research problem

The research problem can be formulated as follows:

1. What is the impact of the agricultural transformation in Kaoma district and particularly in Nkeyema and its surrounding villages? What are the social responses of the traditional farmers and

different groups within the local population in the area to the changing agrarian and economic circumstances and to the government programmes of agricultural development?

2. Who within the local community has initially been involved in the process of social and economic changes? What were the recruitment procedures by the government? What were the constraints to participate in modern agriculture: cultural-, material, political or ethnic background?

3. What were the objectives behind the government policies? What were the formal arrangements to carry them out?

Combining historical, political, social and economic aspects, I shall try to explore the mechanisms by which social and economic inequalities are maintained and reproduced. I shall trace the ways in which changes in the rural economy affect the peasant mobility.

2.2 The research method

The major problem in the field was that I was not able to communicate directly with the local people in their own language, many of the traditional farmers do not speak English. The time I had did not allow me to study the local language. Therefore, I was assisted by an interpreter. My assistant was a junior high school teacher from the native population who knew relatively a lot about the general situation in the area. In Nkeyema, where part of my research took place I did not face a language problem. The majority of the farmersthe former assisted tenant farmers, family farmers and the recently established commercial farmers do speak English.

At Nkeyema, I lived with a family who belonged to the native population (Nkoya) of the area. I was offered one room which was big enough to sleep and to work in. As a researcher, I had to adapt my self to the local situation, and although I had had a rural background in Ethiopia, it took me a few days to feel at home there. The people were very co-operative. By chance, I rarely had problems in contacting the non-native people in the area. The native educated people in Nkeyema and Kaoma have done a lot to assist me in several ways. Apart from being my informants, they also introduced me with the officials in the district and the province and with the government and public organisations (the management of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, the co-operative unions, the district's farmers associations and the Lima Bank branch in Kaoma).

In conducting my field work, I employed two basic methods: participant observation and survey research. The research area comprised approximately 100 villages out of which 36 contained the operational population: 7 villages in Kalale, 15 in Kazo, and 14 in Njonjolo. The selection was based on a random sample of adult farmers of the indigenous population whose age was >28<75. Thirty-eight male peasant farmers and twelve women peasant farmers were interviewed. The questions were structured. In Nkeyema rural town I conducted a survey to find out how many native villagers were participating in local trade and business. In addition to the survey research that I conducted in the surrounding villages and in Nkeyema, I also carried out a series of open interviews with the traditional leaders in the district, with government officials and leaders of public organisation in the province and in Lusaka, with eight tenant farmers (three of them were assisted tenant farmers from 1972 up to 1980) and eight family farmers (three of them were the first family farmers recruited by the scheme management in 1972) in Nkeyema, and with the councillor of Nkeyema rural town. The material that I gathered at the village level in Nkeyema and the surrounding area, enabled me to show how the local people responded to the alternatives created for them by the Tobacco Board of Zambia and later by the private investors in agriculture, local trade and business. I also attended an initiation ceremony, and, unfortunately, the burial of Chief Kahare Kabambithe traditional leader of the eastern part of Kaoma district. I also learned a lot from informal and open discussions.

2.3 The research area

Before the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema scheme, the Nkeyema region was part of the Kafue National Park. It is located in the eastern part of Kaoma district. The other research areas are Kalale, Kazo, and Njonjolo valleys. All of them including Nkeyema area are parts of Kahare's Chiefdom. The nearest research area to Nkeyema is Kalale, which is about 5 km from Nkeyema town. The second research area is Kazo, situated between Nkeyema and Njonjolo (a place where Chief Kahare has his palace or royal establishment). Finally, Njonjolo village, is located near the palace.

A village is composed of a number of households. A small village has at least 2 to 3 households, whereas a big village consists of 9 to 10 households. We may define a household as a unit of family whose composition includes uncles, aunts, grand parents, parents, and other persons such as a house helper or farm labourer. The members normally live together in one house or on closely related premises and take their meals from the same kitchen. A household may also consist of an atomised family but rarely of only one member.

2. Map of Kaoma district and wards in Kaoma district.

Source: Adaptive research planning team, Mongu, Western Province, July, 1993.

III. Historical background

Zambia is a land-locked country, with 752,614 sq. km of territory and with a population of around 8.7 million people in 1990. It borders in the north Tanzania, in the west Angola, in the south Botswana, and in the east Mozambique. Chieftainship has long been the characteristic political institution of most people in Zambia. The Lozi kingdom developed an imperial structure, and was favoured by a relatively prosperous valley environment which encouraged dense settlement.

It was the Portuguese in Mozambique who first began to involve parts of Zambia in regular trade with the outside world (Roberts: 1976). Gold and ivory were the principal exports until it was largely replaced by the slave trade. The important items of trade during the eighteenth century were local products which met everyday needs: foodstuffs, metalwork, pottery, clothing, cosmetics. Trade in Western Zambia was dominated from the later eighteenth century by the Lozi kingdom, on the upper Zambezi river valley. The Lozi people had established a powerful state to which tribes all around paid tribute (Hall 1968:30).

In 1840, the Lozi kingdom was exposed to external pressures and it was occupied by the Kololo (militarily-organised South African immigrants). The Lozi were also weakened at that time by a power struggle and dispute over the royal succession (Roberts 1976:126). The Kololo established a capital at Lukulu, at the north end of the Upper Zambezi valley. In 1864 the Luyana state of the Lozi or Barotse was recaptured from the Kololo (van Binsbergen 1992).

Zambia, or Northern Rhodesia as it was known before independence, experienced a unique evolution in its colonial history. It was ruled by the British South Africa Company (BSA) from the 1890s until 1924. It was then under the control of the British colonial office until it became part of the Central African Federation in 1953 (Tordoff 1974). The BSA Company was a chartered company formed in 1889 to administer and develop the territories of Central Africa for the benefit of its shareholders (Bates 1976). The company sought minerals whose exploitation, it hoped, would provide more profits to the shareholders. It extended its influence in three major separately-administered spheres. In the south it operated in what was to become known as Southern Rhodesia. In the Northwest it established its influence largely through the Barotse Protectorate, where it maintained a close relationship with Lewanika, the chief of the Lozi (Bates 1976:13).

The advent of British administration brought additional administrative duties to persons with positions of authority. The chiefs were recognised. They received a small salary, commanded their own retinue of paid councillors and officials to act as executives, and were made directly responsible to the District Commissioner. Below them were the unpaid village headmen. Thus the village became the smallest unit of administration. Village headmen were given responsible positions: they were expected to see that all taxable males residing in their village paid their taxes regularly, but they were not required to collect the tax themselves. The net result of this change was that the headman and the chief were incorporated into a formal administrative hierarchy with the District Commissioner representing the apex at the district level.

During the company rule, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and particularly Barotseland (Western Province or North Western Rhodesia as it was called during the colonial period) was increasingly seen as a source of labour (Palmer 1980) for the mines in other parts of Southern Africa where the BSA company had interests. This practice was particularly strengthened by the then king of Barotseland, Lewanika, who worked closely with the Europeans and signed an agreement with the BSA company (Caplan 1970). Lewanika believed that he needed the protection of the Europeans to safeguard himself against internal opposition and his kingdom against an Ndebele invasion (Caplan 1970:38 & van Horn 1977 :148).

The BSA company's policy was set. On June 27, 1890 the Barotse concession was signed (Hall 1968: 69), which was later called the 'Lochner Agreement'. By 1897, Northern Zambia was rather vaguely divided into two parts: north-western Rhodesia, covering the exaggerated domain of Lewanika up to the Kafue, and north-eastern Rhodesia, beyond the Kafue. The company agreed to aid in the education and civilisation of the native subjects of the king. In the concession the company received the right to prospect for gold in outlying areas of the Lozi Kingdom.

Partly to encourage labour migration and partly to recoup some of the administrative costs it incurred, the company imposed a hut tax throughout the country (Bates 1976:44). The hut tax proved to be a great success for the company. Defaulters were arrested and some left their homes. Barotseland was to remain underdeveloped, its primary function being the supply of labour to the company. The imposition of the hut tax assured the success of the objective to encourage labour migration. Many native young people began streaming south. Prior to the introduction of the hut tax, people used to pay their tax in kind, in the form of agricultural produce or of 'free labour'.

Before colonial rule, the chiefs did not appear to have obtained a firm monopoly over long-distance trade, although they clearly had many advantages over individual entrepreneurs. Ivory and slaves were the main items of trade, for both of which chiefs were potentially a good source of supply. Chiefs also tended to own substantial numbers of slaves, some of whom were purchased, others captured in raids and others enslaved for debts. Surplus accumulated by the chiefs was used to build their political power and was hence redistributed to headmen and other persons of influence (Muntemba 1977:347). Early colonialism not only spoke of the right of the people against the chief it also set its face against domestic slavery and tributary labour. Domestic slavery and tributary labour were abolished in 1906 under pressure from the colonial administration (Ranger 1971). Thereafter, for cultivating their own fields the chief and his councillors either had to hire labour or rely on dependants. This brought the Lozi agricultural system to a high complexity where efficiency was a necessary pre-condition in order to be able to supply the virtually compelled labour for the mines. The long-term consequences were that Barotseland had to import food to maintain its population. As a result its agricultural production collapsed. Ranger (1971 : 22-23) summarises the then agricultural situation of Barotseland as follows: '...communications and facilities were not developed, partly because agricultural and other products were not really wanted from Zambian rural areas; what was wanted was migrant labour...'

The colonial state policy thus had a very bad impact on Lozi agriculture and showed very little interest to the development of the area.

A feature of Zambian agriculture during the colonial era and prior to independence was high proportion of subsistence agriculture in the total agricultural output (Chilesche 1987). A crucial aspect of economic change was the encouragement of settler farming by the colonial administration. The emergence of cash crop farming in Zambia was a direct result of the changes brought about by the British at the turn of the century. The white settlers concentrated on the expansion of agricultural development heavily discriminating the native African people. The settlers expanded their farms as the tobacco boom provided them their first reliable export crop. Tobacco-growing was carried out on European farms. The kind of tobacco that was grown mostly was the Virginia flue-cured tobacco. The general policy of the settlers was to limit the state's ability to encourage the adoption of superior technology by the peasants along 'the line of rail'.

According to Chipungu (1988) ; it was to a large extent the fear of peasant competition that led the colonial state to discourage the widespread adoption of new crops in most rural areas in colonial Zambia. Crops such as coffee, tobacco and cotton that had commercial value and attracted European settler interests were therefore discouraged in peasant areas. However, maize production was tolerated for various reasons; as Chipungu (1988:53) writes : '... maize has become the best known in the country and discouraging its production was just not feasible, the economy could not have absorbed most of the peasants who would have become labourers, and the expanding African labour force in the Copperbelt had to be supplied with food, and settlers alone could not provide all the food required as they were also somewhat vulnerable to periodic drought and pest outbreaks...'

With few local opportunities for employment at that time and with limited local markets for agricultural produce, the majority of the population in Barotseland (Western Province) had little choice but to send their men out in search of employment mainly in mining and urban areas along 'the line of rail'. From the late 1920s, with the development of mines in the Copperbelt, the movement was to some extent redirected in the country. The colonial policy concentrated on a relatively prosperous copper-based economy. Labour migration became a wide-spread phenomenon throughout the country, but especially in the peripheral provinces of the West where the opportunities for the sale of agricultural produce remained very limited throughout the colonial period.

At independence in 1964, Zambia had only a few hundreds citizens with secondary school education, and less than one hundred were university graduates (Chilesche 1987). In addition, the country also inherited a weak and meagre administrative and social infra-structure. The structure of the economy

was based on its major export, copper. Zambia continues to concentrate on its export sector and on fulfilling the requirements of its partly-nationalised mining industry. Very little attention has been given to the agricultural sector. Pricing policies and price fluctuations have also influenced the degree in which people participate in commercial agriculture as well as the types of crops they grow for the market.

The development strategies of the post-independence period were characterised by increased state intervention in the economy, the expansion of free social services and subsidies for consumers. In the mid 1970s, Zambia seemed to reorient its economy, especially since copper's share in foreign exchange had been declining increasingly. As a result, the government has undertaken a variety of development programmes, including the establishment of co-operative movements, Intensive Development Zones and the establishment of production schemes in many parts of the country. The fact that these institutions were to be initiated, funded, supervised and trained by the government consequently meant that the decisions of the central government largely defined the environment within which various organisations functioned.

IV. A comparative analysis of development theories

The aim of this chapter is to give a global review of different kinds of approaches that are related to developmental problems. I will start with the classical work of European social scientists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their approach is crucial to study the current situation of the developing countries. The second section in this chapter discusses the transformation of peasant societies.

4.1 Development theories

The analytic origins of social-scientific forms of enquiry have been traced back to the writings of a diverse group of 'enlightenment philosophers', in France: Voltaire, Rousseau, Condorcet, and in Scotland: Hume, Ferguson [check Ferguson]. Toward the middle of the eighteenth century, systematic efforts were done to offer scientific theories of cultural differences. The focus of the social scientists was in general on the key elements of modern thought concerning the value of science, the power of reason. The long complex process of erosion of traditional institutions and practices, the diffusion of modern forms of life, seemed to promise the prospect of increasing progress and control. During the nineteenth century, the notion of progress became popular with classical sociologists, political economists and anthropologists. People like Comte (1798-1857) and Spencer (1820-1903) made analogies between societies and the biological organisms. Classical anthropologists as Tylor and Morgan saw the industrial society as a dynamic result of the social revolution. They placed societies and their historical developments in phases that were passed in an evolutionary process (Kruit & Konnings [check Konings?] 1988: 76-77).

Most of the social scientists wrote of a 'social development' in the context of grand theories of social change, addressed to a question of how a society of one type is transformed, or transforms, into another in terms of grand concepts of evolution and progress. Auguste Comte postulated a progression from the theological (explanation by animism, spirits, or gods), to the metaphysical form (explanation by abstract philosophical speculation) and finally to positivistic (scientific explanation based on observation, experiment, an comparison) modes of thought (Collins & Makowsky 1984:27). L.H. Morgan divided the evolution of culture into three main stages: savagery, barbarism, and civilisation. Marx and Engels based their approach on historical materialism and differed sharply from the liberal tradition of Comte. They saw class conflict as the main explanation of social change. According to Marx, history was the outcome of the struggle between social classes for control over the means of production. Durkheim and Weber belong to the founders of the current sociology and anthropology in their effort to form a theory which has dominated the current academic and literature world. Both scientists described the then social changes as the outcome or result of industrial capitalism. Weber, like Marx, grappled the question of the rise and development of western capitalism, but he did not view it as a stage in the universal history of society, but rather as an historically unique phenomenon. Why it had not developed elsewhere was Weber's main problem, and he sought the answer in the different economic ethics of the world religions. He thought that the kind of economic ethics favourable to capitalist enterprise was only to be found in Protestant Christianity, and to a lesser extent in Judaism (Scharf 1970: 27). He regarded

capitalism as a set of institutional arrangements including rational bookkeeping, formally free labour, and the separation of the household from the work place. Durkheim put emphasis on the complexity and differentiation of societies which resulted under the pressure of the industrialisation process. He analysed the division of labour, with its distinction between 'mechanical' and 'organic' solidarity. The first characterises a society in which there is little division of labour and people are like-minded because they perform similar tasks and the structure of a society consists of homologue segments like clans. Members in such a society share the same knowledge and experience and therefore accept the same rules, values, and authority. The second was identified as a complex society with a high degree of division of labour and with a social structure consisting of interdependent associations, like industrial enterprises, exchanging of goods and services with one another (Scharf 1970: 24-25). Comte, Marx, and Durkheim have developed evolutionary conceptions of social change. The idea of progress and the associated notion of a natural evolutionary process of human development, were extended from the sphere of knowledge to the more general social and material conditions governing human existence.

Thomas Malthus is famous for having presented a more pessimistic analysis and prediction. He stated that poverty was the result of a law of nature (Collins & Makowsky 1984:85). He foresaw population increase outstripping production growth, resulting in starvation which, in the absence of and/or in alliance with, other disasters would tend to lead to an equilibrium ratio between production and population levels, via a natural reduction of human beings. Malthus' view has been criticised for its inefficiency. Technological advancement as well as sociological and general medical and scientific factors have contributed to and have resulted in the phenomenon whereby family size and population growth rates decrease with growing affluence and national wealth. Parsons was the foremost exponent of a neo-evolutionary conception of social development. His work was in large part a synthesis and an elaboration of the nineteenth century European classics. He argues that social change is directional and progressive.

Before World War II most of the part of the globe now called the 'Third World' was divided up into colonies of the European powers. After the World War II concentration was on decolonisation, and on changes in the international economic and political order. The view that the colonised countries were poor and the others rich was explained in terms of: the later were advanced and the former were backward, the latter have passed through the stages of development, associated with industrialisation, ahead of the former. This problem has received much attention from many scientists. It was also the beginning of development thought in terms of 'modernisation' and 'economic growth'.

The most important and central issue in all these approaches was that development was seen as a problem of economic growth and the formation of modern societies as it had been developed in the western societies and following the western model. In the modernisation approach the concept of dualism was used to identify the 'modern' from 'non-modern' societies. Traditional societies (non-modern) were viewed as static and unchanging. Goldthorpe writes: '... traditional societies were characterised by subsistence economies using 'Biblical methods' the ox-drawn wooden plough, hand sowing and planting, head carrying, 'cottage industry' using little or no mechanical power, powerful and dogmatic religious institutions. By contrast, the modern societies were viewed as changing dynamically, characterised by innovation, technological advance, and economic development. Religious dogma and traditional political authority alike were rejected...' (1988:133).

A persistent problem in development practice is the lack of consistency between development objectives and realisations. As the collection of papers in this thesis indicate, development bureaucracies and implementers are incapable of successfully pursuing policy objectives which directly challenge the fundamental tendencies guiding a particular society or development project. Basic and interrelated ideas have dominated much of the literature on the issue of development since the late 1950s. The basic assumption of most of these studies was that development was regarded as a purely economic phenomenon. Development was seen as the diffusion of economic growth along with the diffusion of modern 'values'. The main focus was on the concept of 'stages of economic growth' in which the processes of development were viewed as a series of successive stages through which all countries must pass. The main cause of underdevelopment in developing countries seemed to be just a lack of capital which was an important co-operant factor of production but the result was quite the opposite. Many countries in Africa, for instance, stagnated economically. This situation produced something of a crisis in the field of development studies. Growth and development increasingly came to be seen as separated, the former being used to refer to an economic process, the latter to a series of normative changes associated with the improved well-being of the population as a whole.

Two main schools of thought in the study of development were 'the modernisation school' and the 'development of underdevelopment school' (Tordoff 1984:15). The modernisation theory was underpinned by an assumption that societies in developed countries have achieved 'take-off' some time ago. It is now the turn of developing countries to travel along the path through various stages of growth. This can be achieved as a result of the diffusion of Western capital and technology, as well as Western political and cultural values. Modernisation is defined by C. Welch (Tordoff 1984:16) as a process based upon the rational utilisation of resources and aimed at the establishment of a 'modern society'. Its most important characteristic is a core of belief in a rational or scientific control.

The modernisation theory effectively aimed to provide a gradual, non-revolutionary model of development based on a belief in progress, rationality, and mechanisation or industrialisation. This theory has been subjected to a number of criticisms as it has failed in its objectives. It was criticised for its Euro-centrism and for its assumptions (modernisation = westernisation = progress). The theory totally ignores the causes of the complex of patterns of global uneven regional economic development and misunderstands the dimensions of effective interventions in problems of underdevelopment. The aid given by the developed nations is determined by these nations according to their own priorities, and besides the aid is also a cost which the developing countries must pay either immediately or in the long run. According to Tordoff (1984), the initial stress on the key role of industrialisation was in practice irrelevant to the many underdeveloped countries which lacked mineral resources, sources of energy, technical skills and accessible markets. Modernisation theory placed emphasis on weakening traditional authority and behavioural patterns. This was because it not only denied what was often a rich cultural heritage that could be harnessed to the process of change, but it also ignored the fact that legitimacy lay at the base, rather than the apex. A good example was that of Zambian chiefs who were involved in implementing rural development programmes. Finally, the theory gives insufficient attention to the socio-economic basis of society: specifically: it says little about social formation, modes of production and class conflict.

Economic growth had been considered as the principal criterion of development on the understanding that it was necessary to establish a productive base through accumulation first, and when that had been achieved, it was necessary to confront problems of redistribution. The 'trickle down effect' was thought to ensure redistribution and a corrective government action could always be invoked to speed up the process. 'The trickle down' theory of development (Todaro 1989:651) is the notion that development is purely an 'economic' phenomenon in which rapid gains from the overall growth of GNP and per capita income would automatically bring benefits (i.e., 'trickle down') to the masses in the form of jobs and other economic opportunities. The main preoccupation is therefore to get the growth job done while problems of poverty, unemployment, and income distribution are perceived to be of secondary importance.

The trickle down effect has been slow and small, however, it has not reached the poor, especially in the rural areas. The optimistic view of the trickle down of modernisation theorists, that economic growth would result in a convergence of regional per capita incomes, has not been supported by evidence. The cause of the obvious failure of this approach in independent Africa, theorists maintain, (Seidman 1977:410-11) is to be found in the characteristics of the rural population: their attitudes and traditional institutions hinder the emergence of the necessary entrepreneurial behaviour required to take advantage of the new opportunities created by the expansion of the export sector. Others suggest that the fundamental causes of the wide-spread rural underdevelopment, are to be found, not in traditional attitudes and institutions, not even in the lack of market incentives, but in the set of institutions and class relationships shaped in the process of carving out externally dependent export enclaves during the colonial era. Colonialism systematically undermined pre-existing agricultural and trading systems in order to coerce Africans into providing the low-cost labour needed to produce cheap raw materials for export to the factories of Europe.

Developing countries are widely regarded as the victims of the past wrongs of colonial rule and the present inequities of the international economic system. The underdevelopment theory traces the relationship between the 'Third World' and the expanding capitalist economies. Underdevelopment is no longer viewed as an original condition; it is a result of the incorporation of colonies and newly independent nations into a world economic system. Underdevelopment is therefore the resultant effect of the colonial and neo-colonial economies, mal-integration into the world capitalist system, and the exploitative and unequal economic relations between the satellite (the developing) and the metropolitan (developed) countries. The short-term and long-term effects of this unequal relationship characterise

both the colonial and post-colonial periods. The surplus of the peripheral countries is extracted for use in metropolitan countries; the latter manufacture the raw materials, for example cotton, copper and tobacco, which they have imported at prices determined on the international market and they export these manufactured goods at prices determined by themselves.

The underdevelopment school was also criticised for a number of reasons. Tordoff (1984:24) has this to say:

‘...while the theory is almost by definition anti-Western, it fails to differentiate between the different attitudes of Western powers; moreover, it is over-generous in its interpretation of the motives of leading socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union. The theory is also not able to explain adequately the causes of underdevelopment and the failure to recognise the significant autonomous histories of developing countries, especially in the process of class formation, or to highlight the resistance to colonialism...’

Nelson-Richards (1988) supposes that the nature of the Tobacco Board of Zambia stands for the benefits of the capitalist system vis-à-vis the managerial elites of the board and quasi-capitalists in the form of assisted tenant farmers in the rural areas. This is explained in terms of metropolis-satellite relations, thus implying asymmetry in economic, political and cultural terms. In my view these asymmetries should not be visualised in terms of simple economic, political and cultural polarities. Many other variables of social and political nature are at play. One should identify the interest groups both at the national and as well as at the local level and the various social agents involved in stimulating and manipulating the flow of capital and power that is generated within them.

The role of traditional rulers and the local government authorities in the modern state are not to be underestimated. These groups have big influences on the rural economy.

The ‘Articulation of Modes of Production’ theory grew parallel to the Dependency theories. The theory focuses on the micro-analysis of underdevelopment and on the articulation of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production in the peripheral social formations, demonstrating the dominant role of capitalism within articulation and the way in which this dominance is used to ‘conserve’ and to ‘dissolve’ the pre-capitalist modes of production.

The concept of articulation of modes of production recalls culture contact with the advanced world, although no doubt with a much more materialist basis. The relevance of this theory was first made clear by the critique which Ernesto Laclau launched against André Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. Laclau points out four elements which are important for the definition of the ‘modes of production’ (cited by Kruit & Konnings 1988:103) :

- a) The owning of means of production;
- b) The way how surplus appropriation is taking place;
- c) The nature of division of labour;
- d) The level of production forces.

According to Laclau, underdevelopment is not a direct result of the processes within capitalism, but rather of the combination of capitalism with non-capitalist modes of production. The mode of production and its articulation provide a means for linking traditional and meaningful anthropological concerns to the economic and political realities beyond the local rural community.

The social formation in many developing countries is characterised by many more modes of production (where the capitalist mode of production is playing a dominant role) in mutual relations. The relations are in such a way that the reproduction of each of modes of production is influenced by the reproduction of the other modes of production. The tributary modes of production were destroyed by the colonial legislation abolishing slavery and tributary labour and were being subordinated to the spread of capitalist relation of production. The arrival of the European colonialists led to many changes in the traditional agrarian structure. The British colonial rule acted as an important catalyst for change through its effects on the pace of monetarisation of the indigenous economy. Van Binsbergen writes: ‘... The penetration of capitalism had numerous structural effects on the local society: wage labour, migrancy, monetarisation of bride wealth, fragmentation of productive units and of settlement, partial dismantling of traditional authority by divorcing it from exploitative economic base ...’ (1985:217).

The experience of the 1950s and 1960s development practices did not achieve the overall growth targets, and the levels of living of the masses of the populations in many developing countries, especially in Africa, remained for the most part unchanged. This signalled that was wrong with the definition of development. Consequently, economic development came to be redefined in the 1970s in terms of improving the general welfare of the rural community: reducing or eliminating poverty, inequality, and unemployment in the context of a growing economy. 'Rural Development' as defined by the World Bank '... is a strategy designed to improve the economic and social life of a specific group of people the rural poor. It involves extending the benefits to the poorest among those who seek a livelihood in the rural areas. The group includes small-scale farmers, tenants and the landless...' (1975:3).

Measures taken to improve the agricultural system did not achieve their objectives. Policy implementation was not in connection with the local situation at the village level. The policy favoured the already rich farmers but not the rural poor. The rural development policy was mainly characterised by unequal access to resources; the better-off and more powerful benefited more from services than did the rural poor. However, the situation did not change, and even worsened, in the 1980s as the GNP growth rate turned negative for many developing countries. Faced with mounting foreign debt problems governments were forced to cut back on their already limited social and economic programmes.

In the 1990s the free market paradise is propagated by Western economists and politicians who seek to convert the developing nations, if not by free will, then by the whip of the World Bank, IMF and donor pressures. The economy should be liberalised and free elections (multi-party system) should be permitted. Few developing countries seem to follow this line. During the 1980s the concept of promoting free market and laissez-fair economics has been propagated by the conservative governments in the United States, Canada, Britain and Western Germany (Todaro 1989:82). According to this theory, the neo-classical Counter-revolution underdevelopment results from poor resource allocation due to incorrect pricing policies and too much state intervention by overly active Third World governments.

4.2 Transformation of peasant societies

The sociologist Goran Hyden studied the material and social realities in developing countries. Especially in sub-Saharan Africa these are unique phenomena. The absence of an intermediate technology in agriculture, the relative autonomy of the peasant from the state 'the uncaptured peasantry' and the limited penetration by capitalism are at the root of the problem and are responsible for the failure of many development projects in the continent. (Hyden 1986).

Geschiere and van der Klei (1988) consider the key concepts of Hyden about the 'uncaptured peasantry' and the economy of affection as being too general. The degrees in which peasants respond to or escape from state authority and continue their production vary from place to place. One needs to understand the situation from the base. The forms of capitalist penetration differ and so do the local patterns of socio-economic and political organisation. Ranger, in his discussion paper about the situation of the African peasantry, has to say the following:

'...we need to understand particular African societies at the grass-roots, village by village level in order fully to understand the variability of their relationships to the colonial economy...' (Ranger 1978:128). He rejects the idea that peasants were always against the penetration of capitalist relations.

Van Binsbergen has showed clearly the specific case of the Nkoya people by demonstrating their historical patterns in the articulation of local organisational forms with respect to the modern market economy and the post-independent state: '... most adult Nkoya had had, as labour migrants, years of experience with modern political and economic conditions; modern education and Christianity had made significant inroads. Aloofness vis-à-vis the modern state could not have been an unadulterated survival of ancient structures (a case of non-penetration) it is an adoption within a modern framework (a case of rejection) ...' (van Binsbergen 1986:53-54). The introduction of particular export crops and the construction of roads have relatively increased the peasant's participation in the modern economy.

In a review article which is addressed to Hyden in particular, Kasfir has noted the following: '...peasant involvement in capitalism is far more extensive than Hyden does suggest. Patron-client relationships connect the peasants to the larger economic order and the patrons who gain control of the state apparatus have little difficulty in exploiting the peasants (Kasfir 1986; 339-351).

Many studies about changes in rural communities focus on the transformation of 'peasant societies': how do the peasants react when they are confronted with the centralised state's authority and penetration of market relations? (Migdal 1974, Scott 1976, Popkin 1979). Increasing the agricultural production and its productivity is one of the conditions to improve the standard of living in rural areas. Increase in production can only be realised if the available resources (land, labour, agricultural implements) will be used efficiently, or through the introduction of new production techniques. Anyway, one may raise the question of how far the traditional societies are willing to go in adopting new production techniques to improve their agricultural production.

Joel S. Migdal (1974), in his contribution to peasant studies, discussed the differentiation of the villages on the scale of external relations by specifying the factors which indicate the degree of participation, external wage labour, commodity marketing mechanisms, and involvement in cash economy. Migdal argues that the movement from 'inward to outward orientation' was most likely to occur when there were forces at hand which consistently and systematically made it impossible for large numbers of the village's households to balance their accounts. Although 'culture contact' was a necessary condition to the exposure of modern norms and values, the central factor according to Migdal (1974:91) was the world-wide imperialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

James C. Scott (1976) has placed emphasis on cultural factors. Peasants prefer to produce traditional crops over cash crops. The social institutions of the village communities are based on guaranteeing survival. Peasants are averse of risk and focus on avoiding risks. According to (Scott 1976:41): '...well-to-do villagers avoid malicious gossip only at the price of an exaggerated generosity. They are expected to sponsor more conspicuously lavish celebrations at weddings, to show greater charity to kin and neighbours, to sponsor local religious activity. The position of the better-off appears to be legitimised only to the extent that their resources are employed in ways which meet the broadly defined welfare needs of villagers...' Scott also places emphasis on the 'subsistence ethic' of the peasant society. The subsistence ethic is deeply rooted in the economic practices and social exchanges of peasant societies. He argues that the peasant household has little scope for profit maximisation.; instead they seek to avoid the failure that will ruin them.

Scott's vision on peasant societies is criticised by Samuel Popkin in his book *The Rational Peasant* (1979). Popkin reproaches authors like Scott, Wolf and other substantivists for their overly romantic picture of rural societies. According to Popkin, they regard the penetration of capitalism as the big evildoer, which disjoints traditional harmonious relations and survival mechanisms. Popkin's basic assumption focuses on individual decision-making and on an expanded concept of the role of the village in peasant economic life. The penetration of market relations provides the peasants with the possibility to withdraw from the power monopolisation of the rich farmers. Popkin (1979: 26) writes: '... peasants make long-term as well as short-term investments, and they make risky as well as secure investments. Both conflict and co-operation, both power struggle and wide-spread benefits, are inherent in village patterns of distribution and collective action ...' If situations are favourable to improve their positions, the peasants are ready to invest for the future. And that is why the penetration of the money economy and of the centralised state can not always be seen as a threat. Sometimes it can open the right alternatives and give the possibility to break the traditional dependent relations.

During the colonial period, Nkoya villagers migrated southwards to the mines in Southern Africa in which they became wage labourers. The village economy became relatively diversified as the result of the increase of cash interaction with the outside world. Recent changes in the land tenure systems (as the result of the erection of the tobacco scheme in the Kaoma district by TBZ) have increased the intensity of outside penetration. The post-colonial state's penetration in the rural areas caused not only such things as competition for modern agricultural inputs, but also new institutional security and economic opportunity for those with proper resources. Wealthier native urban returned emigrants had some sense for increased participation in modern agriculture and in local trade and business. Nkoya people who had already settled in Nkeyema and who were reasonably well-to-do became patrons for the new migrants and for the lower classes from the village. These urban returned emigrants serve as contacts in forming outside alliances. They have become the mediators of the village with the outside world who must likely know the channels of communications and patterns of outside behaviour to

operate in the new milieu. This forms the basis for further differentiation of the village population. Outside reference groups are the bases for social mobility.

The adoption of new technology and procedures from outside by the villagers depends on a dynamic historical process. First, those who went to the mines as labourers and who settled in towns, and then returned to the villages, and those who have enjoyed modern education will jump into the new opportunities. The recent development of mass media and infrastructure networks also become increasingly important to maintain ties and channels of social and economic exchange. The creation of co-operatives, a government monopoly which distributes fertilisers to the peasants, the formation of farmers' associations and lending institutions are also important factors which have contributed to the outside participation of the peasants in Kaoma district.

Many Nkoya peasants exposed themselves to new and greater risks by migrating to the new growing rural towns in Nkeyema and Kaoma to search for casual work, contract jobs, etc. Capitalist relations of production are advancing steadily and may soon dominate agriculture in the district. Land is not scarce in Kaoma district and risk is not typically the key variable in decision-making whether to go over to cash crops or to remain producing traditional crops. The rich farmers hire labour regularly, and poor peasants use this outside employment opportunity.

The Nkoya's response to the resource crisis has been to move seasonally to Nkeyema and the surrounding areas to sell their labour to more fortunate farmers. This dramatic change in agrarian structure and agricultural technologies has been attributed to changes in the size and quality of holdings as well as in the tenurial [**check**] status of cultivation. Accumulation, resulting from increased agricultural commercialisation, represents a change in the role of material wealth. For rich farmers it meant an unprecedented material advantage in terms of expanded production. The majority of the rich farmers are not from the native population. This has probably created a favourable situation for them as compared to the native rich farmers who directly or indirectly feel obliged to share their surplus with the villagers. Therefore, the surplus of the non-native rich farmers, instead of being redistributed within the traditional community to enhance economic security and to increase the density of social networks, is now converted into cash and much of it is now reinvested into production. The wealthy farmers in the district have invested in bore holes to secure access to water. Animals like goats, pigs and cows are raised next to their maize and tobacco fields. Some farmers also plant sunflowers, groundnuts, and cotton.

The problem to participate in modern agriculture is that resources which are necessary for cultivation are not available for everyone; when they are, it is only for those with much money and privilege. In short, the poor have no access to inputs. Currently, the majority of the peasants are aware of social improvements and the advantages of modern agricultural inputs. Peasants have to pay for medicines, school fees, uniforms and school books for their children. Thus, given the motivation and the necessary institutional facilities the peasants are now willing to participate.

The success and failure of any particular development project (as we shall observe in the next chapters) is a question of interest, management quality, usage, and effective distribution of the local resources. The recent case of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme demonstrates that the organisational capability of development bureaucracies was weak. Little effort has been done to determine to what extent the assisted tenant farmers were capable of producing the results aimed at by TBZ. In studying the situation of the farmers and of local lending institutions and co-operatives in Kaoma district, it is not difficult to suggest that not all problems were lying at the local level. It is not an easy task to give a simple explanation and /or generalisation in the case of peasant's participation in the modern state. It rather needs to be examined in the light of historical and social processes: conditions and experiences, the emergence and the impact of internal and external forces; their determination to influence material and cultural production, their articulation, differentiation, and contradictions.

In Africa, especially in the former Northern Rhodesia, hired labour was of the migratory type. Wage labour was created artificially, at least in part, by a variety of extra-economic coercions. It was not based on a naturally evolving full integration of the traditional farmer and/or the peasantry into modern relations of production. Under the company rule, for example, Barotseland's primary function was to provide cheap labour for white sectors of Southern Africa (Ranger 1971). Hence, in the case of Zambia, the rigidity of the nation's state of underdevelopment has been exposed to the first oil crisis, then to import cost escalation and lately to an unmanageable debt service burden. Therefore, the mining

industry did not directly cause a development spread to the rest of the economy. In general, the colonially-established structure of political economics became incapable of generating development.

It can also be theorised that the underdevelopment of the developing nations is partly a result of the traditional elites, who have unnecessarily concentrated on unproductive consumption, without redeeming national values and strong social controls. Myrdal's analysis (1971) stressed the importance of attitudes, institutions, and policies. The course of socio-economic development is not merely to be regarded as the outcome of blind impersonal forces, but it is largely to be determined by conscious choices and decisions, mainly on the part of governments. The rise of corruption in most underdeveloped countries and the very serious effects it has for national consolidation and all planning and plan fulfilment, is seldom mentioned in the economic literature on underdevelopment planning. According to Myrdal, the underdeveloped countries are all, in varying degrees, 'soft states' (Myrdal 1971 :34, 211). Corruption is an integral and important part of the 'soft state'. It hampers growth and development, and is a major contributory factor to inequality. Myrdal concluded (1971:63-64) that inequality and the trend toward rising inequality stand as a complex of inhibitions and obstacles to development and that consequently, there is an urgent need for reversing the trend and creating greater equality as a condition for speeding up development. The weakness of political institutions in developing countries is characterised by a lack of social discipline, deficiencies in law enforcement, and the disregarding of the rules by public officials at all levels. On the other hand, colonialism and neo-colonialism have both depleted the economic and social resources at their command but have also brought many benefits to the colonies, including infrastructure, political security, law and order, a civil service, sanitation, education and contacts with the outside world.

Development is a complex process, amounting to a good deal more than the achievement of the self-sustaining economic growth projected by the earlier social scientists. A host of non-economic factors, such as the political and social institutions prevailing in many developing countries are also important in determining the extent and rate at which newly introduced techniques are adapted, reformed or totally ignored. According to Todaro (1989:88) development must, therefore, be conceived as a multi-dimensional process involving major changes in social structures, popular attitudes, and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, and the eradication of absolute poverty.

The next chapter discusses the political situation and the agricultural policy of Zambia as a whole. It also attempts to discuss the socio-political life of the Nkoya people, the position of their chiefs in Kaoma district and their relation with other ethnic groups.

V. Socio-economic and political development

The erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme in the district has not resulted in a meaningful development of the general welfare of the majority of the people in the area. It also seems to have been a mistake to assume that only the presence of capital, skilled labour, and private entrepreneurial spirit (if it had already been there) would lead to higher production and economic development. The nature and capacity of the local and national political context play also a significant role.

The patterns of political and economic development in the early post-independence period have varied from country to country. The market system (a capitalist system which allows for market forces of supply and demand) has at times been condemned right out of hand. The opposing thesis has been that of planned economy, scientific socialism. Zambia has seemed to show no interest in both ideologies but has instead formed her own humanistic philosophy. The ideology of Humanism was elaborated in 1967 by K. Kaunda, the then President of the Republic of Zambia (Tordoff 1974). Humanism opposes the division of society into mutually opposing classes, as much as it opposes the establishment of capitalism or communism (Dillon-Malone 1989). The strategy of the post-colonial state was to concentrate on transforming the rural society by raising the range and volume of agricultural production and encouraging new social modes of production. The aim was basically to decrease the social and economic disparities between the rural and urban areas, and to help create self-sustaining improvements in incomes and productivity in the rural areas. The Zambian government implemented several policies in an attempt to boost agricultural development. This policy was partly made possible by a relatively prosperous, copper-based, economy. The government expenditures on agricultural infrastructure included provisions for, among other things, water wells, canals, feeder roads, collection depots, and training institutions. A co-operativisation programme was launched and village and ward level committees were established.

Unfortunately, the overall achievements in all the areas of rural development have been inadequate. According to Molteno and Tordoff (1974), the village and ward committees lacked trained leaders. The village headmen who were supposed to lead the village productivity committees tended to be elderly and poorly educated. The villagers had not been trained on large scale in simple technical skills that were needed for successfully undertaking self-help schemes. The failure of the co-operative movements is the product of the political climate, of the constraints on rationality inherent in bureaucratic forms of organisation, and of the specific internal difficulties in departments.

The lack of co-ordination within the co-operative movement was related to an ideological opposition between the 'Humanists' and 'Technocrats' (Pottier 1985 :101). According to (Quick 1978), rural development in Zambia can be characterised by two major alternative options: the Humanist and the Technocratic option. The Humanist option wanted to transform the rural society by narrowing the gap between the urban and rural standards of living. The objective of the Technocratic option was to maximise the production of agriculture. The main focus was on a combination of large-scale, capital-intensive state farms and an efficient marketing and pricing system. Thus the emphasis was on rationality, technology and productivity.

The ideology of Humanism has been subjected to many criticisms. To some it was a utopia, highly theoretical and thus notoriously difficult to convert into concrete policies. To Tordoff and Molteno, Humanism is neither exhaustive nor sufficiently explicit on certain issues, and it lacks an 'ideological primary group' dedicated to spreading its values (1974:38).

The United National Independence Party (UNIP) has been the only party in the country to be identified with Humanism, since Zambia became a one-party state in 1972 after the incorporation of the African National Congress (ANC) into UNIP. Until recently, Zambia's government was a centralised single-party state. It was headed by an elected president who stood for election as a single nominated candidate of the single ruling party. The president, apart from being the head of state, was also the leader of the ruling party, the chief executive of government and Commander-in-chief of the armed forces. This represented a remarkable concentration of power and authority, with the head of state as the most enlightened patron (Crehan 1990). His position and unique status have affected the effectiveness of policy implementation.

UNIP, the only legal political party, had a complete hierarchical structure, beginning at the grassroots level and ascending through the branches, at district and provincial level, to the centre where the most powerful party organs were located. The bureaucracy, both at the centre and at the local level, was an extension of the UNIP. Szeftel (1980) writes: ‘...in the first 16 years of independence, Zambia has been characterised by factionalism, patronage and scramble for the ‘spoils’ as represented by the state-controlled resources. Political leaders rest on their support and mass following from areas where they are from, where they are familiar and have social links...’ Once they come into power, most of them never go back even to thank their voters. I was told by the local people in the area that they have never seen their MP who had promised to do everything he could. I agree with Szeftel about the way he describes the situation of politics in Zambia : ‘...those who attain political office lack wealth and alternative avenues to accumulate it ,therefore there is a tendency to use state resources to enhance personal fortunes...’ (1980:77). There have been many complaints from the districts, voiced against practices that were adopted by the centre.

Local political conflicts and traditional disputes between neighbouring tribes revive occasionally. This has partly been the fault of the creation of the colonial state which favoured some ethnic groups, especially the Lozi, in the former Barotseland. Throughout the colonial period, the colonial state allowed the Lozi ‘indigenous administration ‘ a fair major of autonomy in dealing with the subject tribes as Ila, Tonga, Kaonde, Luvale and Nkoya. Most of these tribes were able to escape the Lozi domination and humiliation as reinforced by the colonial government. For the Nkoya, however, did not, in fact the powers of the Litunga (king) and his aristocracy became more articulate.(Van Binsbergen 1986: 48-50).

5.1 Facts about Nkoya

The Nkoya people reached their present living area in the course of the last centuries. The name Nkoya stems before the imposition of the colonial rule. One of the royal clans (the one owning of the Mutondo royal title) of Nkoya said to have lived about 1800 (van Binsbergen 1980). Nkoya Lukena consists of a palace, councillors, retinue and an orchestra which is subsidised by the state. There are three chiefs in Kaoma district, all of them recognised by the state. The senior chief, Litiya is from the Lozi Royal Family and both chief Kahare and Chief Mutondo are traditional leaders of the indigenous people, Nkoya. In 1985 each had the following number of villages in Kaoma district: Chief Mutondo 810, Chief Kahare 461, and Chief Litiya only Naliele village within Chief Mutondo’s area. I shall come back to this point when I discuss the position of the Nkoya chiefs in Kaoma district.

All land and basic natural resources were owned by the state, but placed the custody of the chief. Land holdings consisted on agricultural fields and fishing sites. Each community had (has) a headman who, in consultation with the community elders and household heads allocated fields, fishing sites and other production media. Allocation was made to family households, by virtue of right of residence and need, and in the name of the chief. The relation between subordinates and superior,, whether between chief and headman, or headman and community, involved a comprehensive range of mutual rights and obligations to each other and to the environment.

During the colonial period the District Commissioners (DC’s) were not actively involved in administering the rural people. Instead, it was the chief who accepted orders from the DC’s and implemented their policies in accordance with the laws prevailing during that period. This type of indirect rule through a chief, appears to have been effective for the British. Recognition was given to the chiefs, especially in Western Province. Here, the British South Africa Company signed a treaty with Lewanika, the king (Litunga) in 1890. This became the basis of the company’s subsequent claim to mineral rights over lands that were beyond the Lozi control. Barotseland remained to be a protectorate until Zambian independence in 1964. On May 18, 1964 , President Kaunda and the Litunga signed ‘ the Barotse Agreement ‘.The main purpose was to establish the Barotse’s (Lozi’s) position within Zambia in place of earlier agreements first with the BSA company and later with the British. After independence Barotseland became an integral part of Zambia, but with its traditions preserved, and the Litunga was to retain greater powers over local government matters greater than granted to any other chief in Zambia. Currently, the Litunga has lost his authority over the wild life areas and fishing sites.

5.2 The position of Nkoya during and after the colonial period

During the colonial period, the 'Lozi administration' enjoyed a fair autonomy and also some influence on other ethnic groups. Especially the Nkoya villagers and their traditional leaders were humiliated and suppressed by the Lozi administration. The post-colonial Zambian state has done very little to improve the situation up to now. Nkoya participation in terms of socio-economic, political and cultural activities during the colonial period was very limited. The power relegated to Nkoya traditional authorities was marginal and receding. In 1936, a son of the Lozi chief was sent to Mankoya district to assist the native authority and a year later he was converted into a chief when a new Lozi Royal Establishment came into being five km from the Mankoya Boma called Naliele (Van Binsbergen 1992:38). The presence of the Barotse Royal Establishment in Mankoya district was regarded by the native chiefs as undesirable as it was a vestige of British colonialism. Nkoya chiefs who did not want to be subordinates of the then Lozi prince at Naliele, objected and brought the matter to the attention of the colonial authorities. Through the actions of the Lozi representative chiefs in the Nkoya region, the Nkoya chiefs were exiled, dethroned and even poisoned. The then reigning Nkoya chief Mutondo Kanyincha was poisoned by enemies a day before judgement on the case was passed. His successor, chief Muyita Muchaila, brought up the issue again, but finally he was also found guilty by the Lozi Royal Establishment court and sent into exile for ten years (van Binsbergen 1985 & 1992).

Even in the late 1950s, the establishment of the African National Congress (ANC) branch in Mankoya district was prohibited. As a reason for this the then District Commissioner (DC) for Mankoya has reported: '...the ANC has concentrated on the theme of self-determination for Mankoya district, i.e. freedom from Lozi domination together with secession from the protectorate, and this has attracted both interest and support from certain sections of the Mankoya and Bamashasha tribes...' (Tordoff 1974: 49).

The installation of the Lozi prince in 1936, was responsible for a continuing immigration of both Lozi and Angolans into the region of Nkoya. Since the 1920s, the land of Nkoya had been encroached upon by Lozi and especially by thousands of Angolan (Mbunda, Luvale, Luchasi) immigrants. The Nkoya were also victimised by the colonial government as a result of the creation of the Kafue National Park in the 1930s, they had to cede much of their agricultural land and hunting territories. Educational and medical facilities were concentrated only near the centre of the Lozi power in the district, which was the centre of Barotseland as a whole (van Binsbergen 1985: 206-207).

The colonial government did very little to improve the situation and since independence there has not been any progress either in improving and restoring Nkoya pride. The use of Nkoya books in the district primary schools was prohibited in 1966 and the Lozi burnt the books that until then had been used in the schools.¹⁾ The name of the district was changed from Mankoya to Kaoma in 1969. This wiped out the last traces of official recognition of the district as Nkoya land. At the same time, the name of the province (Barotseland) was changed into Western Province. According to Caplan (1970), there was a fear from the central government for Barotseland's secession from the rest of Zambia and for renewing links with the apartheid regimes in Southern Africa. The Lozi traditional rulers lost their authority over the area's wild life and fishing rights so that the Western Province, stood on an equal footing with the other provinces.

The erection of the tobacco scheme in the district, near to the Kafue National Park in 1971, attracted many migrants from all over the country. The participation of Nkoya people remained very limited except for a very few belonging to the royal families. All economic benefits went to the newly-come ethnic groups and especially to the Lozi, who owned many hectares of agricultural land in the area, and who had dominated the province for more than a century.

In 1992 twelve South African commercial farmers and businessmen settled around Njonjolo, about 20 km south of the palace of Chief Kahare. Two of them have already started exporting timber. The settlers have promised not to hire labourers from outside the area. Both have employed 40 indigenous people.²⁾ Whether Nkoya people are going to profit from this is a question which requires further research. We did not have enough time to interview the South African investors. The discrimination of Nkoya people is also visible, for example, the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme management has granted land to farmers without the permission of the Nkoya chiefs.

The two main Nkoya chiefs, chief Mutondo and chief Kahare were denied the status of senior chief. Chief Litiya from the Lozi Royal family in Naliele is the only senior chief in the district, and

accordingly he receives more subsidies than the indigenous chiefs. The Nkoya chiefs demanded the removal of chief Litiya from Kaoma because, according to them, there are allegedly no Lozi subjects for him to rule there. They stated this in their seven-page complaint to the then President K. Kaunda on 12 March, 1990. Their complaints included that:

- a) the Lozi traditional administration in Kaoma district had produced a Village Register in which nearly fifty percent of the villages were given to Chief Litiya: 1200 to Chief Litiya, and 600 and 150 to Chief Kahare and Chief Mutondo respectively;³⁾
- b) the Lozi had organised an open campaign against the Nkoya's during election periods;
- c) the Lozi prohibited the Nkoya to participate in any socio-political affairs.

The following table shows Nkoya participation in various positions in the early 1970s.

Table 1.

	Nkoya	Lozi	Bemba	Mbunda	Others
District governors	-	1	2	1	5
District political secretaries	-	2	-	4	-
District youth chairmen	-	2	-	2	-
District women chairmen	-	2	-	3	-
Administration	-	5	-	1	1

Source: The letter addressed to the former President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda (by the two indigenous chiefs of Kaoma district).

The Nkoya people regard the Lozi as their suppressers who make them uncomfortable in their own home. The main advantage that the Lozi have, is their exposure to education that has enabled them to secure higher posts in the most strategic positions, both in Western Province and in the capital, Lusaka.. Any Nkoya who may happen to have had a better education is either denied a position or sent far away to the bush. A Nkoya junior secondary school teacher in Kaoma district told us the following story: '...I have been deliberately frustrated not to be confirmed as a teacher after serving for more than seven years. According to the conditions of services someone is supposed to be confirmed within 6 months' time. If you are not confirmed you are not allowed for further studies with the assistance of the Ministry of Education or you are not able to be appointed in high positions. Currently, I am confirmed, but it came too late and I am no longer young . Nevertheless, I have applied for further studies in Lusaka, but my application is not yet processed...'

Many other Nkoya told us the same story: '... we have managed to pursue education because of the simple reason that we lived outside the Western Province where we had escaped the oppression by the Lozi. When you have very few people educated and almost none in strategic positions, the government's efforts are equal to zero. Because among the government, the Lozi are there and they can not push up things which have to do with Nkoya, instead complicate them...'

5.3 The Relations of Nkoya with other ethnic groups

The relationship between the Nkoya and the Lozi has been discussed as being very bad. Nkoya's relations with other ethnic groups as the Luvale, Mbunda and Luchasi is very unpredictable according to many native people. These ethnic groups fear victimisation from the Nkoya as they stay in the land of the Nkoya. From the Lozi's point of view, the tribes remain friends as long as they support the Lozi, for example during election campaigns. The opinions of the Lozi about these tribes are stereotypes: they are Mawiko (westerners), or people from the west, Bazwalhulle (people from distant places), and Manke (people who have no culture).

The Lozi are dominant in the province, politically as well as economically. They have used the ethnic groups against Nkoya. The Mbunda people were manipulated to vote the former Nkoya minister out of parliament. The Lozi spread propaganda that the minister was discriminative and was planning to chase

other ethnic groups away from Kaoma district, etc. The Mbunda believed this and supported a Mbunda candidate, who won. Many Nkoya people feel that this dirty trick, which was happened during the electoral campaign of 1988, was used just to deprive the Nkoya from any political participation. However, when the Lozi were pressing for the restoration of the 1964 Barotse Agreement in 1992, the Mbunda and other ethnic groups dissociated themselves from the Lozi and supported the Nkoya.

If the Lozi fail to hold these ethnic groups in the province , there is a fear that the Nkoya people may team up and rise up against the Lozi. Some Nkoya elites have been pressing the government and requested for the formation of a new province, which would be called Kafue province.⁴⁾ According to some radical Nkoya: ‘..there is historically no hope for the two rival groups (Lozi-Nkoya), there is no and there has never been a sign of Lozi improvements and restoration from the attitude of humiliating and dominating to an attitude of mutual understanding and respect for one another...’ They think that the only solution will be the formation of a new province without the Lozi . A letter written to the MMD government (Movements for Multi-party Democracy) suggests a province which is going to comprise the Nkoya with ethnic groups of Central and North Western province.⁵⁾ According to some observers, and even to some Nkoya elites, this suggestion is a one-sided story trying to paint a good picture of the Nkoya. However, it might be helpful to the government, too, since the government itself has a problem with the Lozi. The Lozi have requested the government several times to receive more political and economic rights in Western Province by recalling the Barotse Agreement of 1964 which gave them a somewhat enshrined special status within the province.


5.4 The role of Nkoya chiefs in Kaoma district

The colonial government had recognised the status of the chiefs and were paying them subsidies. State recognition of chiefs and state subsidies continued much as the colonial period. The independent state, with the creation of the House of Chiefs, hoped to bridge modern and traditional principles of government. However, the modern state did not give the chiefs the necessary power and status (Van Binsbergen 1986). Currently, Chiefs have refrained from politics, i.e. direct involving themselves with political parties despite the fact that the country in plural or multi-party state is. In any case the chiefs should remain royal to the ruling party as it had been by the previous one-party state.

The status of the chiefs has been greatly reduced as compared with the past. Now the chiefs have authority, but without power i.e. they only occupy position. The power that the chiefs had, has been taken over by the modern state. The chiefs had the right to game, fish, forestry, and tributes from their subjects. They are no more allowed to hunt unless with a license, and even for cutting trees they need permission from the Department of Forestry. Therefore, the chiefs are currently simply custodians of land. The government has the right to intervene in land issues, and can reserve or demarcate traditional lands.

The hierarchical structure of chieftaincies in Zambia is as follows: the House of Chiefs on a national level, followed by Paramount Chiefs and Senior Chiefs in the provinces and districts and finally chiefs at local levels. Nkoya chiefs are the last in the pecking order. Both the paramount chief positions and the senior chief positions belong to the Lozi. Beneath any chief are: a prime minister, a secretary, sub-chiefs, and headmen. The global hierarchical structure in Chief Kahare's area in terms of authority is given below as an example.

Diagram 1. Rural Society: Hierarchical Structure in terms of Authority in Chief Kahare's area



N.B. Three Royal Musicians and three Royal Guards are paid as casual workers, two Security Guards are permanent employees.

Prime minister (Ngambela)

The prime minister is the spokesman of the chief. Traditionally, the chief does not speak aloud or address a gathering. The prime minister gives instructions in the name of the chief even when the chief is present. Guests or visitors who want to meet or speak with chief are supposed to report to the prime minister in advance, who, after examining and considering the purpose of the visit, will consult the chief for permission and make an appointment. There is no direct route to see or visit the chief, but only through the Ngambela. The Ngambela is recognised by the modern state and receives an allowance. The power that the Ngambela possesses depends upon his reputation and relation with his chief.

Secretary

The post of secretary has only been recently introduced and in certain places it does not yet exist. The secretary is not officially recognised by the state and as a result he does not receive a state allowance. His duties are therefore purely voluntary and loyal. The post has been introduced in order to assist the chiefs in interpreting government policies and official documents composed in the official language. The secretary is chosen from retired civil servants.

Sub-chiefs (Indunas)

The Indunas are the chief's cabinet chosen from the competent headmen to settle disputes that are referred to the chief. There are five Indunas in and around chief Kahare's area. The council of Indunas forms the traditional court. The council is headed by the Ngambela who is the chief's spokesman and advisor. All developments are reported to the chief for confirmation or analysis. The council of Indunas has the right to advise against the Ngambela, when he is found to be incompetent or working against the chief. The Indunas were paid allowances during the colonial period and by the post-colonial state up to 1966.

Headmanship

Headmanship is a title given to a village. A village is made up of or defined as consisting of all members related by blood, marriage or adoption and also including other persons who live in the same compound. Villages are named after their headmen. The formal status of a headman dates back to the colonial period. The colonial state accorded headmen a bureaucratic status by issuing them with the 'book': the village register used for administration and collecting the hut tax (Van Binsbergen 1992). The post colonial government has also recognised the position of the headman. A headman receives no allowance. He represents the chief in his village and normally keeps a village register with the names of the heads of the households together with their members. Transferral forms are also available for those who want to leave the village so that they may be included in the village where they want to go to and settle. A headman has the right to refuse to accept new settlers if the village is not big enough and if the settler has a bad reputation. In many cases, both headmen should agree on someone's transfer.

A headman is expected to maintain peace in his village and settle family disputes. Any development such as farming, the establishment of schools, clinics, roads in the area and the necessary contributions for these activities must be sanctioned and encouraged by the headman. He distributes land to the people in the village and also protects the chief's lands by avoiding illegal settlements and the illegal killing or hunting of some wild animals. Serious issues relating to instability in the village are referred to the chief where the Indunas sit to judge. Other cases, like that of illegal settling or witchcraft accusations, are also referred to the chief.

Nkoya chiefs, although officially answerable to the senior chief Litiya in Kaoma district and the paramount chief in Mongu, are not in direct communication with their superiors. The indigenous Nkoya chiefs had and still have a legal conflict with their seniors. The chiefs trace it back to 1936 when the Lozi prince Mwanawina Lewanika was sent to their area. The domination of the Lozi dynasty over the Nkoya had been founded by Lubozi Lewanika (Van Binsbergen 1992: 22-23) with European support, after a treaty was signed between the Lozi paramount chief and the BSA company, in which the land and people of the Nkoya were incorporated into the subject area of the Lozi paramount chief. Currently, the Nkoya chiefs have no any direct relation with their superiors. If the chiefs want to settle or request things, they contact the district secretary of Kaoma district.

We were able to observe an example by chance the indirect communications during our stay in Kaoma. Lt. Gen. Godfrey Myanda, minister without portfolio (the third man after the current president) came to

settle the disputes between the Nkoya chiefs and the senior chief Litiya in December 1993. Unfortunately, the minister found Chief Kahare in hospital and he died three days after the arrival of the minister. The minister attended the burial ceremony of Chief Kahare Kabambi with other government personnel (the council secretary of Kaoma district, prime minister of chief Mutondo, and journalists and cameramen from Lusaka. There was no representative from the Lozi Royal family as they had not been informed directly by the Nkoya themselves. At the burial ceremony, the minister said in his speech to the family and thousands of chief Kahare's subjects that he had been happy to see and visit the chief before his death. He praised the chief for what he had done for his people and the country during his reign in the district. He pleaded with the people not to ask somebody: What is your tribe? Where do you come from? Instead: How many bags of maize have you harvested? How many acres of land have you ploughed, etc..? '...We are brothers and so we should work together and develop our country...' One of the representatives from the royal family thanked the minister for his presence and said: '...the government and the party should not only preach democracy, pluralism, liberalisation, economic development, etc. but must also protect and respect the minorities ...'

The majority of the Nkoya in the rural areas still practise subsistence farming, fishing and gathering. Traditional feasts and ceremonies are still being celebrated. Rituals are very important in the villages' social life. They are very effective to maintain and assert kinship and political class. The Nkoya men in the Village eat together in the Nkuta, a thatched hut in the middle of the village where men meet for meals and discussions. The issues of reproduction, sex-related affairs, and herbs are taught to young males there. The Women also eat apart with their daughters. Initiations for girls and boys are still being held. Feasts are organised occasionally.

Instruments like the xylophone, drums and others are played. Of the many traditional ceremonies, 'Kazanga' is probably the best organised and attended festival. For many Nkoya, Kazanga is a way of proving their distinctiveness as an ethnic group. Through the initiative of educated urban elites with tribal elders, the Kazanga traditional ceremony was revived in 1988. The Kazanga Cultural Society is currently a state-registered cultural association in the country. Many native people regard Kazanga as a restoration of their pride after more than a century of domination and humiliation by the Lozi. Nkoya history is no more than a mere footnote in contemporary academic and political circles. The yearly Kazanga ceremony has been a great success and a breakthrough in the Nkoya's century-long struggle for recognition.

5.5 Wind of political change in Zambia

Many African leaders often blame colonialism as the chief cause of poverty and misery. According to many African elites, the cause of Africa's problems are largely external: Western colonialism and imperialism, the effects of the slave trade, exploitation by multi-national corporations, the injustice of the international economic system, the inadequate flows of foreign aid, etc. are all named. These empty phrases have increasingly lost their validity. Three decades have passed since the majority of African countries achieved their independence, and external factors are nowadays becoming less convenient as a basic explaining factor. The post-independence African politicians have monopolised power and allowed no room for the indigenous mechanisms of consensus formation. Migdal has to say this, in his comparative study of some developing countries *Strong societies and Weak states*: '...many Third World states have fallen on the lower end of the spectrum in their abilities to achieve social control and effective appropriation of resources. Political leaders use several methods to stay in power; the big shuffle the leader is mostly the only one who appoints and discharges, non-merit appointments -the most popular method here is to appoint top agency officials having deep personal loyalties to the state leader and those appointed continue to use kinship as an important criterion for recruitment to state posts...' (1988:197-260).

The over-centralisation of political and economic power has turned the leaders into a huge patronage machine and has bred elite cronyism. Bates (1976) has noted the following: '...once seized, the instruments of power are used by the leaders to enrich themselves and further the interests of their ethnic groups or professional class...'

During the period of the one-party state in Zambia, the idea of relative altruism and subsidisation of almost all essential commodities had a bad impact on the economy. The country produced surplus to subsidise the upkeep of the ruling class and a few urban elites. Political interests were mainly geared to

urban modernisation (along the line of rail) and development. A pricing policy and price controls were for a long time favoured to create low food prices for the benefit of urban consumers against raising and improving agricultural production prices for the great majority of the rural community (Pottier 1985).

The political system did not encourage competition but instead bred inefficiency. World price fluctuations, over-dependence on copper, the decline of the copper price, the oil price escalation crisis, the increase of the price of machinery and other imported articles, together with the internal political problems caused a high inflation under which the majority of the people suffered. The value of the country's currency continued to depreciate due to lack of production and export for earning foreign exchange. This being the case, food prices shot up to such an extent that strikes were part of daily life. The political wind of change did not therefore leave Zambia untouched. The collapse and fall of communism and socialism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were probably also of influence. As some opposition groups articulated the situation : ‘.. if the founders of socialism failed to keep their ideology then, who are we to stick to it if we are copying from them...’

Certain elite groups formed an opposition party. Among them were also intellectuals from the Lozi royal establishment. All these opposition groups combined against the ruling party UNIP the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) under the leadership of the former trade unions leader, F. Chiluba. The opposition became stronger so that it could press for an immediate referendum to decide whether people should opt for plural politics. Elections were therefore called before the end of term of office of the president in 1991 and MMD won by a large margin. Zambia has currently more than thirty officially registered political parties. Out of these, MMD, UNIP and the National Party (NP), Caucus for National Unity (CNU), National Democratic Alliance (NDA) and United Democratic Party (UDP) seem to be vocal, although only the first three parties currently have representatives in the parliament.

5.6 Socio-economic and political developments in the new government

The post-colonial elites were the architects and beneficiaries of the process of centralisation and nationwide social domination. Urban dwellers continued to command the inequitable economy and social benefits at the expense of the rural population. The dual system of local government was unsuitable. It was essentially alien to most local people, particularly in the rural areas. Among the educated and top groups in key administration and economy positions, as we have mentioned earlier, there was an ideological confusion and lack of national self-confidence. Some were even and (still are) caught in the cobwebs of regional allegiances, nepotism and corruption. The established structure of the political economy was incapable of generating equitable development based on equitable and effective participation.

A dozen years of political monopolisation under a one party-system came to an end as a result of the democratic elections that were held in October 1991. Zambia became a multi-party state. The Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) under the leadership of F. Chiluba won the election.

The MMD government inherited a country which was under a state of emergency. The new government, when it came to power, promised a lot: improving the economic situation, health facilities, medicines, education standard, and disconnecting the government from party, etc. Further, the government promised to fight corruption in the form of drug trafficking, car smuggling and abuse of office. Hardly a year after MMD came into power the rate of crime increased in the country. The government directed all defence forces to join hands and curb the alarming crime wave that rocked the country. In his speech about the criminality in the country, the President described the situation as follows: ‘..the task of reducing the crime wave is enormous and it has reached alarming levels. The defence force must work hard to insure that life, property and liberty of its citizens are protected. If crime continued, investors would be scared to come to Zambia...’⁶⁾

The current socio-economic environment of the country may have contributed to the increasing of crime. The more unemployed people the country has (especially in big towns), because of lack of employment, (formal or informal), the more the crime rate soars, because people need food, shelter and clothing, but they do not have any legitimate means of earning such things. The role of the government policy in improving the socio-economic situation in the country still remains a big challenge. Liberalisation of the market and prices has been introduced in the country giving the right to anyone

(especially in the agricultural sector) to sell his produce to anybody at any price and anywhere. This trend and move was welcoming to the farmers who for a long time had the price of their production imposed on them. But it was an unfortunate happening when the government suddenly imposed a price on the staple food maize at a time when the crop was ready for the market. Some big farmers thought of exporting their produce, but, then the government limited the amount of bags of white maize for export. In addition, the farmers had to apply for an export license from the ministry which was subjected to a refusal. Some did manage to obtain a license and they were able to export the amount of bags as conditioned by the government. Unfortunately, within the same period, the government manipulated the country's currency (the exchange rate) by reducing the value of the dollar. Even after the farmers sold their produce against the government imposed price, the government had no money to pay them. After waiting for more than four months in the 1993 harvest season, the government was not able to pay the farmers. Instead, they received a 'promissory note' which enable them to receive farm supplies only, but not cash. Many farmers have the feeling that they are left in the cold, because they are in bad need of cash to start cultivating for the next season. They are not able to hire labourers, oxen and tractors, to buy equipment, fuel, etc.

During the one-party state education was expanded and was free. Health facilities were also accessible to every Zambian. Now, everyone has to pay a certain amount of money to send his children to school and health facilities are no longer free. The government marketing board is no longer a monopolist. The new government withdrew subsidies from the staple diet and devalued the country's currency, the Kwacha. The prices of fertiliser are also due to rise, which will hit poor farmers particularly hard.

Politicians often look to the state to get their shares and to enrich themselves. The MPs, once elected by the people, never go back to the area where they come from, not even to give their thanks to their voters, let alone to ask about and discuss their social and economic problems. Not only the politicians, also officials in people's organisations, as we have mentioned in chapter 6 grab what they can and undermine the organisation they are supposed to be working for. The current government appears to have little idea how to blame the previous government for inhibiting the people from undertaking self-initiated efforts to adequately provide for themselves.⁷⁾

The opposition parties pressured that the President to fire some of his ministers and to promise an investigation into others. In December 1993, ministers and donor countries complained about corruption, abuse of office and drug trafficking: 'Zambia is regarded as the Colombia of Africa' The situation was so serious that Zambia at the Paris Club meeting was requested to look into allegations concerning top leaders, or no loans would be granted.⁸⁾ The minister of foreign affairs stepped down voluntarily to pave the way for investigations as he was repeatedly referred to as one of the suspects. Few others followed him, however, so the prompted President gave a press conference on 11th January 1992 and there fired two ministers. The President disclosed that more than ten reports were made concerning his ministers but there was no concrete evidence and most of them were clean.

The opposition parties have steadily strengthened themselves, National Party (NP), that split from MMD, especially. The issue of the formation of the NP was connected with the Lozi and more with the Barotse Agreement. This is partly because of a brother and a sister, A. Lewanika and I. Lewanika from the Lozi royal family. A. Lewanika, one of the strong founders of MMD, seems to have revived the matter of the restoration of the Barotse Agreement. Some are suggesting that ex-MMD members were not satisfied with government appointments. These ex-MMD members blame the government for the country's difficulties and for favouring certain ethnic groups, especially, the Bemba. We find it very difficult and too early to identify the NP as a 'Lozi party' and to claim that its members are trying to press for an accommodation of the Barotse Agreement. The whole issue has left Zambia in suspense, and especially after the recent demand from the donor countries to dismiss ministers involved in corruption. This idea could support the resignation of MMD members who formed the NP as not having been on power hunger or as power-hungry agitators and the idea of the restoration of the Barotse agreement.

The prospect of a sustainable process of democratic development is doubtful in Zambia. The economy remains mired. Patronage and nepotism in public appointments are common practices.⁹⁾ The MMD government has lost many of its members as the team spirit with which the UNIP government had been overthrown, diminished. All these problems are partly the result of a political transformation. The concept of a loyal opposition and the essence of modern democracy rarely prevail in many developing countries. The principal task is to strengthen the status quo. It will take time before the effects of the

recent political transformation based on multi-party democracy become visible. Problems should be corrected by the country's leaders themselves; fighting the corruption and smuggling goods, etc. This can be done through a practical transparency, accountability and openness of information. If this is not done, the pains of transition will remain to be very strong.

VI. Agricultural development in Kaoma district

In this chapter I shall discuss the agricultural development in Kaoma district in general and in Nkeyema rural town and the surrounding villages in particular. The socio-economic situation of the Nkoya people before and after the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, their participation in modern agriculture, local trade and business, their lack of opportunities and major constraints to participate in such activities will be briefly explained. I shall also give a global theoretical overview on patron-client relationships, the consequences of agricultural transformation/modernisation which might have led to economic disparities and/or class differentiation in the area. Also, this chapter discusses the contribution of co-operative unions and lending institutions to the development of the area.

Kaoma is one of the six districts in the Western province . It is located in the eastern part of the provincial Headquarters (Mongu) near the Mongu-Lusaka road. The district extends eastward until it reaches the boundary between Western and Central Provinces. Kaoma shares this boundary with Lukulu in the north, and Sesheke and Senanga districts in the south .

The population of Kaoma district is increasing rapidly, as can be observed from the 1990 census when the district had 112,747 inhabitants as compared to 1980, when it had 87,942. Currently it is estimated to have a population of more than 122,000.¹⁰⁾ This increase has been caused by the immigration of people from other districts or provinces. Another important factor that has contributed to the growth of the district was the establishment of a large army base in the early 1980s. This has turned Kaoma town, the capital of Kaoma district, into a multi-lingual town. The major languages that are being spoken are: Nkoya, Luvale, Lozi, Mbunda and Bemba.

The Nkoya are the dominant ethnic group in the district, representing 30-35% of the population. The district possesses the best soil (mostly of the loamy sand nature) and climate for agricultural purposes. Hence, it has attracted a lot of people from other parts of the country. With the agricultural development in the district came the opening of a number of stores in Kaoma and the surrounding areas. Before 1972 there were very few shops but nowadays their number has more than doubled within the past decades. Many migrants have profited from the growth of commercial agriculture in tobacco and maize, which has led to a greater investment in the district, as is manifested in the growing number of stores, local bars, grinding mills, and commercial farms. All this means a general increase in the prosperity of the area, although the effects of economic distribution have been somewhat uneven, especially when one observes the life situation of the large majority of indigenous people living in the outlying areas.

Kaoma district is regarded as the agricultural frontier of Western province. Among the many types of crops grown in the district, the following are very common; cassava, sorghum, millet, and maize. In the last twenty years a great expansion of tobacco growing has taken place.

Cassava

Cassava is grown almost all over the district. Although this crop is grown widely in the area, it has very little value on the market. The most used part of this crop is the root, although the leaves are also eaten as vegetables. The root of cassava is eaten in various ways, either by eating it raw or by boiling and soaking it in water and then roast it or dry it and pound it into powder to cook it into ncima (the staple food).

Sorghum and millet

These crops are mostly grown by villagers. Both are the staple food of the Nkoya. These crops do not require fertilisers. Obtaining seeds is not a big problem, because once a field is harvested the remaining stalks can resist the drought and re-germinate the next season. The government has recently introduced certified seeds for sorghum, but the crop is not yet grown in bigger hectares because of its low demand on the market. Apart from ncima, the traditional food, beer is also made from both crops. During the last twenty years the production of these crops has decreased dramatically as many farmers began to grow maize on a large scale .

Maize

Maize is the staple food of the nation and it is widely grown on a commercial basis, both for consumption and export. Since 1971, maize is widely grown in Kaoma district, for commercial purposes. It contributes to more than 50% of the produce in Western Province.

Tobacco

Not only in Kaoma district, but also in the whole Western province, Nkeyema is the only area where tobacco is grown on a commercial basis. This cash crop is grown by the assisted tenant farmers and the family farmers ever since 1972. Tobacco cultivation requires a large labour input throughout its production, capital for the processing as well as for the growing stages, and meticulous attention, particularly during curing. The type of tobacco grown in the area is Virginia, which is cured in a simple made tobacco barn by heat coming from a flue pipe that has been laid down in the burner while a fire has been lit on the open pipe outside the burner. Tobacco is very delicate and if it is not handled properly one may lose the quality, which is very decisive to get a higher price on the market. The heat in the burner has to be regulated according to the stages. Curing takes about 5-7 days before the tobacco is ready for grading and can be packed for marketing. Tobacco is sold according to the grades of the quality which can be achieved through proper handling.

Plate 1. Tobacco barn.

3. Ethnicity and locality in Zambia.

Source: Religious change in Zambia, W. van Binsbergen, 1981.

Currently, there are different categories of farmers in Western province in general and in Kaoma district in particular. The Department of Agriculture classifies the farmers as follows: the category 'peasant farmer' includes the types, 'traditional/ subsistence' and the 'small-scale commercial'; the categories 'emergent', 'commercial' and 'institutional farmers' are more or less in line with the category 'medium/large-scale commercial farmers'.

It becomes apparent from the following tables that Kaoma district has the highest proportion of commercial farmers and of agricultural produce in Western province.

Table 2.

Production Unit per district in the 1988/89 season.

	Kalabo	Kaoma	Lukulu	Mongu	Sesheke	Senanga
Peasant farmers	17064	15915	10387	23904	9258	10225
Emergent farmers	297	937	279	1095	1801	562
Commercial farmers	-	30	-	-	15	8

Total in Western province:

Peasant farmers: 86744

Emergent Farmers: 4971

Commercial farmers: 53

Definitions:

Commercial Farmer: are those farmers who normally plant 20 ha. or more.

Emergent farmer: are those farmers who normally plant 5 ha. or more, but less than 20 ha .

Peasant farmer: are those farmers who normally plant at least 0.5 ha., but less than 5 ha.

Source: Republic of Zambia Department of Agriculture, March 1993, Mongu.

Table 3.

Estimated annual crop production per district, 1984/89 (average tonnes) Western province Zambia.

	Kalabo	Kaoma	Lukulu	Mongu	Senanga	Sesheke
Cassava	794	1627	2408	2985	3348	289
Groundnuts	6	90	49	11	6	138
Maize	1344	13385	1307	2227	1545	2214
Millet	598	270	509	922	699	494
Rice	631	266	239	1523	166	6
Sorghum	369	123	159	126	555	778
Sunflower	1	13	-	-	1	-
Soybeans	-	36	2	-	1	-
Tobacco	-	80	-	-	-	-
Cotton	-	98	5	-	7	5
Total staples	3736	15671	4622	7783	6311	3781

The average production figures show that Kaoma is the main crop-producing district in Western province with more than 50% of the total maize production and also sunflowers, cotton, tobacco and soybeans are mostly produced in Kaoma district.

Source: Farm Management Section, Department of Agriculture, Mongu, 1990.

6.1 Nkeyema village

The area currently known as Nkeyema or TBZ, was largely a bush full of animals before 1971. The nearest valley in the area was Kalale, which had a community of ca. 10 villages. The Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme became operational in 1971 after being initiated with the help of the government and money borrowed from the World Bank and other banks in the country. The Nkeyema area was therefore granted to the Tobacco Board of Zambia (TBZ), by the courtesy of chief Kahare, the traditional leader of the indigenous people (Nkoya). As is in the name, TBZ came with the sole aim of growing tobacco. That being the case, a three classroom school block, a dispensary, and three houses for teachers was built by the Board. Agricultural extension officers from the Department of Agriculture were recruited temporarily to assist the tobacco growers in the production. A police station and a centre for training farmers was also built. Other institutions were established much later to offer loan facilities and social services: the Nkeyema Multi-Purpose Co-operative Union, Lima Bank (formerly called the Agricultural Finance Company) and the Credit Union and Savings Association (CUSA).

I shall come back later on this topic of lending institutions and their role in Nkeyema.

6.2 Village life before 1971

As I have stated earlier, the mechanism by means of which social change and development were brought about was by the alteration of the mode of production: in the case of Nkeyema village this was agricultural transformation (for definition: see page 47). The low productivity subsistence farming, characteristic of traditional agriculture, resulted from the fact that only small areas could be planted and weeded by the farm family because they used only traditional tools, such as a short-handed hoe, the axe and the long-handed knife. In many parts of Kaoma district the use of animals is almost impossible because of the notorious tsetse fly. Another major factor which curtails output increases in traditional agriculture is the scarcity of labour during the busiest period of the growing season, namely at planting, weeding and harvesting times. Irrigation techniques are not developed, and therefore, the time of planting is determined by the onset of the rains in many parts of the area.

The indigenous people are famously known as hunters and collectors of wild fruits. This is most probably why they inhabited Kaoma district because it was mostly a bush. The name of the district was Mankoya up to the early 1970s when it was re-named after a stream near the Boma called Kaoma (van Binsbergen 1985).

Ritual practices have always been the best form of communications. Village elders, next to the traditional diviner and the herbalists, are the most important agents for keeping the traditional rituals operative and to give the traditionalists a sense of unity. According to tradition, spirits influence the affairs of an individual. It is believed that spirits control the fertility of the land, to bring rain in times of drought and advice on the course of action in times of community crises. They are also consulted in situations of bad health and when men go to hunt. If drought or crises happen, people believe that the ancestors have not received enough offerings, and therefore offerings have to be done and much honey beer must be brewed during the course of the year. In spite of the increase of the work of missionaries since 1910 (van Binsbergen 1981:261) in Kaoma district, and the growing number of Nkoya Christians in most rural areas and even in the recent Kaoma and Nkeyema rural towns, the traditional practices and ritual continue to exist.

The Nkoya people have practised hoe cultivation for a long time. The main labour unit was the family, comprising a man, his wife or wives and unmarried wards. The man was responsible for the clearing of fields, cutting the trees and preparing the soil for planting. However, in cases where the soil was not too hard, women could also work the soil. Women did the planting, weeding, scaring away birds, harvesting, and storing. Sometimes villages organised work parties and also then the same division of labour was observed. The Nkoya used to cultivate small fields enough to feed themselves until the next season. Women did all types of work except for stumping and chopping trees. Children, depending on the age also did the same work as their parents.

There are various types of fields that the villagers used to engage in and these are as follows:

- a) Matapa: river-margin gardens which have very fertile soils. Crops grown are: maize, sweet potatoes, pumpkins and vegetables. Men dig small canals to avoid floods and these canals drain water to the main stream.
- b) Matango: fields around the home of which most of the produce is to be consumed fresh.
- c) Mafuba: big fields situated in the bush where people grow much food and store it when possible.

Unlike nowadays, when people are growing cash crops, all the activities used to be done manually and for subsistence purposes. Even these days, most of the work is done manually, only those very few who have succeeded to engage themselves in modern agricultural activities could afford machines.

6.3 Socio-economic development in Nkeyema area after 1971

The erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme has brought a big change in the area, especially a flow of people to the area, mostly from other ethnic groups. Another change has occurred in the organisation of production as a concomitant to the inclusion of the area in the capitalist system of production.

Nkoya's agricultural production is mainly undertaken by farm households, of which the great majority is classified as 'traditional subsistence'. Other activities as hunting, fishing, collecting are still prevailing and are organised on a kinship basis. For the majority of the Nkoya people, participating in the Kaoma-Nkeyema scheme means an experience of individualisation and isolation. The extended family as a production-consumption unit became largely irrelevant for the management of the scheme. Traditionally, agriculture consisted of cultivation of cassava and sorghum on the rain land during the rainy season and the organisation of the social structure focused on the lineage. Tobacco growing for the market was also unknown. Therefore, the type of native life gave very little opportunity to individual enterprise. Social and political factors determined the economic system.

The villagers are under paternal traditional authority. The father holds the largest amount of property, even often after the marriage of his sons. Consumption and production take place within the family group. The production and consumption roles, and, more importantly, the roles of controlling social distribution in this type of system are determined by kinship lines. The head of the kinship group or the head of the village has many calls on resources. His reputation for generosity and charity is a public tribute to his efficient management of the economic resources over which he has control.

The new form of social and economic organisation on the government level (as with the development project of the Kaoma-Nkeyema scheme) has unfortunately not had any influence on the socio-economic life of the indigenous people in the area. The main types of social characteristics which influence villagers in their ability to choose between different types of production strategy for the continuation of rural social life as a group can be explained as follows;

- a) Tribal affiliation: Ties of kinship or of political allegiance are relevant in everyday situations. The existence of village political organisation is pattern of maintaining stability. Kinship groups ensure the responsibility for one's economic survival. The wealthier members of the community are expected to do some favours. If those people do not fulfil their obligations, sanctions will follow, which sometimes may heighten tension within the rural community.
- b) Survival mechanisms: Within the village's closed system, a prestige economy has developed which either redistributes or consumes the surplus of the wealth of the richest (Migdal 1974: 69). One can not simply enrich oneself without the permission of the society. The standard of living in such a type of rural society is laid down by custom and habit. Reciprocal gift-giving, co-operative labour and mutual aid are means of solidifying bonds among the rural society. Accusations of witchcraft are very common. In a village society where generosity and display of wealth are considered desirable behaviour, representing the ideals of social living, it is very difficult to behave outside the norms and values of the village society. Money accumulation is anti-social and leads to an accusation of being a miser. A complete refusal of co-operation may lead to banishment or poisoning.
- c) Education: There are very few educated people. The value of education in terms of access to resources is indispensable. Those villagers who manage to go to school come to know about things outside of their environment. Education provides the 'key' to understand the world and equips one better to assert ones rights and claims duties from officials. Education also gives a potential access to political and/or administrative resources. It is a weapon of individual mobility. Education represents a means of achieving greater bargaining power to enforce more favourable government policies and to

break the present dependency links with patrons, contractors or usurers. The majority of the villagers lack this opportunity.

d) Kinship: Communities are organised on kinship rights. It is also a production unit. People in the village claim some kind of kin relationship with another village. Social relations involve obligatory gift-giving and receiving in which the use of resources based on ritual observance and tradition. The exchange of labour services plays a large part in helping to guarantee the security of livelihoods. To do away with such traditional social life seems very unlikely, when the government efforts are very limited, and especially when one thinks only on a short term as has been done by the management of Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme in recruiting family farmers from Kaoma district.

It appears from our research that very few villagers have become involved in agricultural activities based on market production. Women rarely participate in modern agriculture. We were able to observe this in our research where no single woman was represented as a family farmer, let alone as an assisted tenant farmer. An explanation for this may be that in the recruitment the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme gave preference to male household heads or single men instead of to their wives or to women. And probably, many male households do not allow their wives to attend courses, for example at the farmers training centre in Nkeyema. Most women are illiterate as compared to their male colleagues, and they have also to look after the children.

Still, it was not even easy for many of the male participants from the village to continue. As Mr. Mukumbi, one of the participants of the indigenous people, explains: '... we had no proper training and the farmers training centre in Nkeyema is a white elephant because it concentrates only on already trained personnel and advanced farmers instead of intensifying training to traditional farmers in the area...' Mr. Mukumbi was lucky to manage and run his farm because of his background. He was an employee of the Kafue National park and has a knowledge of farming, etc.

It is very common to hear negative statements about the scheme, mostly from the native villagers. Elderly villagers, especially, when speaking of the past, often describe a time when mutual aid was the rule in agricultural operations and also in other aspects of village life. They mention that before the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme it was easy for them to continue hunting and collecting wild fruits, as the current Nkeyema was still a mere bush full of wild animals. According to the elders the people have changed in the last twenty years, they no longer extend aid to each other and social relations are no longer phrased in terms of corporate native groups.

Before the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme agricultural land was granted to any non-Nkoya newcomers. Currently, the pressure is felt around Nkeyema area. The massive influx of enterprising migrant farmers, the development of a more settled form of agriculture with the use of plough and tractors has brought a relative change to the system of land tenure.

Nkoya people have begun to attach a new value to the land. Before the erection of the tobacco scheme, land was not bought and sold. Nowadays, some of the unfortunate farmers can sell their farm for a reasonable price, at least in the Nkeyema area. The tobacco scheme management mediates in the transfer of the farm, but without officially recognising the sale of the farm, assuming the price as a form compensation for the money invested in the farm. Prior to the erection of the scheme, neither the traditional chiefs nor the Agricultural Department were responsible for demarcating boundaries. Currently, pressure on land increases. This situation, is becoming very alarming (according to the native elites), as many urban elites are migrating to Nkeyema and demand large plots of land. As a result, the traditional leader of eastern Kaoma district who allocates land, has come under growing pressure to distribute land to returning urban residents and new rural households. The chief, and Nkoya elites are well aware of the critical situation concerning land, land distribution and the settlement of thousands of new migrants.

The construction of a road across the site of the tobacco scheme and the erection of the scheme itself can be seen in general as a fundamental change in the socio-economic life of the people in the area. The scheme has contributed much to but very few successful native farmers and local businessmen. The majority of participants who have been successful were people from other ethnic groups but from the Nkeyema area, and people from other parts of the country. Those who were registered as family farmers own 12 ha. of arable land per person. They were promised to receive up to 90 ha. if they were able to expand their farm. Only few managed to expand their farm and receive extra land. Unfortunately, I was not able to determine the exact number of family farmers who were able to possess 90 ha. Almost all assisted tenant farmers were rewarded agricultural land of more than 200 ha. The current owners or

cultivators are not the former assisted tenant farmers. Only two assisted tenant farmers still continue to farm, but the rest are new migrants from the city and towns in the province and country.

The following table gives us the degree of participation by the native people in Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme.

Table 4. Degree of participation in the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme according to ethnic affiliation.

Ethnic Affiliation

hectarage	Nkoya	Lozi	Luvale	Other ethnic groups	Total
12 ha.	54	91	179	45	369
45 < ha. < 200 ha.	8	7	8	1	24
> 250 ha.	2	11	1	6	20

Of those who own between 45 and 200 ha. only 5 farmers have no any other background of activities, the rest are former government employees, politicians, businessmen, and retired military officers. Of those who own more than 250 ha., 80% are older than 55 and 20% of them have no any other activity. The rest just as mentioned above, were active in several government and non-government organisations. Most of these people have bought their farms from the family farmers who could not manage to run their farm.

According to Mr. K. Kamwaya, a tenant farmer: ‘. . . TBZ had no interest in the development of the area, but only for personal benefits...’ According to him the farms of the unsuccessful assisted tenant farmers were given to one ethnic group and most probably to one family group. According to our observation this may not have happened by sheer chance. It might have to do with the then active General Manager of the Tobacco Board of Zambia who himself belongs to the ethnic group, the Lozi.

Nkeyema village has grown from a mere bush area about 20 years ago to a rural town with a population of about 15,000 out of which the great majority are immigrants from all over the country. One can find restaurants, grocery stores, various retail shops, grinding mills, carpentry, butchery, etc.

The following table shows the most important activities in Nkeyema town and the participation in business according to ethnic affiliation.

Table 5. Participation of Nkoya's in local business and trade in Nkeyema

Ethnic Affiliation						
Kinds of Activities	Nkoya	Lozi	Mbunda	Luvale	Other ethnic groups	Total
Grinding mill	1	3	3	2	1	10
Grocery	2	2	7	3	1	15
Restaurant-bar	5	-	1	-	1	7
Carpentry	-	-	1	-	1	2
Butchery	-	-	-	-	1	1

There are 6 primary schools in Nkeyema and the surrounding areas of which 5 have grass roofs and mud-bricks. The 6th was built by TBZ and made from cement bricks and asbestos. The clinic was built by TBZ and later improved by the government with assistance from the Netherlands, especially for solar energy and medicines.

There are many churches in Nkeyema town and the surrounding areas; among others: New Apostolic, Roman Catholic, Evangelical church of Zambia, Watch Tower and Seventh Day Adventist church. Church ceremonies and celebrations are sometimes a combination of modern (imitated from Western ceremonies and celebrations) and the traditional African aspects, such as moving by holding hands and clapping. There is a strong feeling among the village elders that young people are neglecting their traditions and customs. This is true in some cases. We were able to observe this during the Christmas festival of 1993 and New Year celebration. Many young people, wearing jeans, carrying cassette recorders and walkmans listened to western music while walking on the street, and many others were dancing. At the same time many other people were dancing using their traditional instruments clapping their hands, and almost everybody was drinking local beer and liquor. In spite of all the new situations and happenings, the converted Christians and even the well-educated ones, most of the people living in towns go back to the rural areas during traditional festivals, mainly out of fear for the traditional tribal elders and parents. Many of them fear accusations of witchcraft. These accusations are regarded as punishments from demons or ancestor spirits for abandoning their worship. Therefore, the people go back to their ancestor beliefs and offer gifts. The presence of missionary activity and churches has not been able to totally break the old traditional beliefs and impose a new attitude or world view. The recent burial ceremony of the traditional leader Chief Kahare Kabambi was a clear example of this. The Chief was a member of the Seventh Day Adventist mission but also a custodian of the traditional values and norms. There were, thus, two different ceremonies at the burial place, a traditional and Christian one. The arrangements, the preparations of the dead body and the mourning ceremonies were according to the tradition in the area.

Plate 2.

Plate 3.

Villagers who are participating in modern agriculture and who live near the Kaoma-Lusaka road are able to send their children to school. Almost all schools in the area are concentrated around the tobacco scheme. The nearer a village is to the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, the easier it is to join and to get access to resources. Before the erection of the tobacco scheme there was only one school in Njonjolo, near the palace of Chief Kahare. Currently, there is only one clinic in Njonjolo which is not functioning well, because of lack of medicines, the hammer mills are out of use because of the scarcity of spare parts. There are no local shops. The businessmen of the village and educated people have left the area and have settled in Nkeyema, the new growing rural town in the district. More people from other areas have flocked to Nkeyema and have hired themselves out at minimum wages to assisted tenant farmers and even to some family farmers and currently to rich individual farmers. Many retired urban employees, who are visibly better off than the native villagers, and relatives of the chief were the most advantaged groups. Some headmen were able to use their traditional authority for their own benefits. Those villagers of the area who have been exposed to and are aware of the presence of the tobacco scheme, have left their village and have settled around the scheme. They engage themselves in activities as casual workers in the farm, piece work and short-term contracts. Some of them even exhaust their resources in order to be able to send their children to school. The next two sections will elaborate the participation of these village farmers in modern agriculture and their labour relations with the native and non-native rich farmers in Nkeyema. Before I enter into these subjects, I shall give a general view of patron-client relationships.

6.4 Patron-Client Relationships

In traditional societies in which a subsistence ethic prevails, poor family members are willing to accept a bare subsistence livelihood, and the better off are also willing to assist them. In fact, they are morally and culturally obliged to do this. The poor farmers may use the obligations inherent in kin ties. Poor farmers who are not in a position to cover their costs will be forced to look for alternatives. They enter into patron-client relationships. Amsbury (1979:89) defines a patron as follows: ‘ ... a patron is a person who successfully engages in client-making and client-keeping activities. He is in a position of power (superiority) over others and is expected to render them higher level services, goods or money, including protection from other patrons and would be patrons. In return for this, the others (clients) are expected to render reciprocal lower-level services. A client is a person who has submitted to and is expected to be protected by a patron as client ; he is in a position of subordination and inferior power.. .’ For the client, the relationship can be of a temporary nature or for a long term. One can distinguish two categories of relationships. A long-term patron-client relationship may arise when one peasant family can not subsist without access to the resources of another family. A household which is very poor in both farm outputs and labour, will be dependent on the relatively richer households during harvest time. This may happen between kinsmen, sub-groups within rural society. Irregular occurrences, typically droughts or the death of the head of the household, can lead to temporary dependencies between patron households and client households.

Another pattern of relationships is based on fixed distinctions in which money plays a significant role, for example in the form of a loan based on piece work or a contract. The relationship can have a constant feature which is maintained inter-generationally between the same sets of families or between individuals or families of unequal social status. In such a pattern the relationships can also be imbued with power and political status within the rural communities. The relationship can be outside or within ethnically-based patron-client relationships.

A key feature of most patron-client relationships, prior to the introduction of the money economy (cash crops) in rural societies, is a quasi-familial relationship: clients may share food and domiciles with their patrons and may treat them with the degree of intimacy allowed to that of a junior-status family member. The moral and juridical framework of these relationships is one of kinship rather than legal contract.

The introduction of mechanised farming systems or agricultural transformation has altered the traditional value of labour, permitting or demanding new recruitment strategies. This has led to a new form of relationship networks. Thus, as richer households continue to accumulate wealth, poorer households in the community are increasingly denied the means of production to which they formerly had access through a distributive system involving transfers of wealth and labour. Due to the increase of modern agricultural production and of agricultural outputs, partly as a result of the intervention of diverse institutions, the rich farmers have been able to convert their produce into cash and this has

changed the co-operative basis of traditional agrarian production. Contemporary agriculture depends on individual investments in the form of hired labour and is thus only available to wealthier farmers. Poor households can not convert traditional crops into cash because they lack market values. One can observe that there is a tendency or process whereby some poorer subsistence-oriented farmers are increasingly becoming marginal producers, permanently dependent on the commercialising farmers to whom they hire themselves as workers.

Despite the monetarisation of labour contracts, which I have discussed, one may not expect pre-capitalist labour relations to necessarily dissolve entirely as is evidenced from my research. Although the bond between partners of unequal wealth and social status may be weakened, the cultural expectation is that the long-term and short term expectations from both parties may not totally disappear, especially, as in the case of kinship ties. Farmers, who, for whatever reason, find themselves lacking resources can depend on temporarily hiring some of their labour to rich families to make some money. Generally, rich families seek to detach themselves from the networks of social obligations which formerly served to restore community viability. The commercialisation of agriculture can in many cases still continue to depend on labour, valued in terms of money. The ability to speed up the agricultural transition depends in large measure on the agricultural policy of the government, i.e. whether the commercial market for products pays higher prices to the agricultural sector. It may take long time until the agricultural sector is totally transformed.

Agricultural transformation, according to Timmer (1993), is the process of converting household-oriented, subsistence-type structures into commercial units that have highly efficient linkages to the urban and world economies. Timmer claims that if agricultural transformation is going to have to take place, the policy toward agriculture has to change. It should get agriculture moving order to contribute to growth. The nature of incentives should change. The price policy should change. The way you invest in markets should change. For subsistence-oriented farmers the goals of production are to make use of all aspects of their productivity; production is a very labour-intensive undertaking necessitating intense contact between land and people. For those commercially-oriented farmers, mechanisation means cash expenditures on land, machines and other agricultural outputs such as new seeds, fertilisers, etc. The commercialisation of agriculture also leads to a transformation of the traditional forms of labour division by gender and age. It also involves changes in farming output, which in turn requires a re-organisation of labour. Agricultural modernisation programmes and an increased rationalisation of production among the assisted tenant farmers have brought new machinery, new seeds, new agro-chemicals and new relationships to the district of Kaoma. The better-off farmers with sufficient land and modern agricultural outputs act as patrons.

A wealthy man who runs his tenancy on an entrepreneurial basis most probably employs labour from outside the village. Some of this labour will be employed for a long period, perhaps the entire four or five months of the crop season. He will pay them an agreed monthly wage, and feed them during the time he employs them. Mr. Sunday Mulumba and Mr. D. Mahuno (rich farmers in Nkeyema) both employ men in this way.

Among the many non-native farmers it is common to hear that non-villagers (non-indigenous people) work better than the native villagers. There is no evidence to support this opinion, nor is there any basis upon which to reject it. However, it is a widely held view. Among the eight tenant farmers who we interviewed, none of them hired or used labour from the village. Mr. M. Mahuno, a retired official, currently owns more than 25 ha. of arable land, and he travels to Mongu (about 200 km from Nkeyema) whenever he needs extra labourers. Mr. Sunday Mulumba who has ten management workers and twenty casual workers, but none of them are native people. The non-native farmers use non-market social ties as means of recruitment. It is certainly easier to hold labourers to a certain standard of piece-work when they are outsiders and have no relationship with the employer other than the market. The use of native labourers is mostly done by the few rich native people who are themselves from the village, and who often employ these labourers for several years. Thus, a farmer's friend or relative, or even his friend's son may come to work for him. Retired officials of the native population, especially those from the royal family, use the labour of a few people tied to them by kinship, friendship or quasi-kinship links. Royal family members of chief Kahare, because of their status and reputation in the local community, are the most advantaged group. Status is also exchanged for potential patronage. Some of Chief Kahare's relatives get their farm ploughed free of charge by individuals who own the tractors in the village. People of status are in a more advantageous position, because they have status and therefore credit, so they can easily get access to cash (from lending institutions in the area) as well.

6.5 Nkoya's participation in modern agriculture

Proportionally, many of the villagers in Kalale area participate in wage labour in agriculture. They participated in seasonal wage labouring; farm and off-farm activities. The villagers who live far away from the Kaoma-Lusaka road miss the opportunity given by the scheme and various lending institutions. No efforts have as yet been done by the government to overcome the infrastructural problems; those living in the outlying areas are the victims of this. Consequently, the great majority live in difficult conditions, their farming system has not improved or changed, they have no access to education, and they suffer from malnutrition and poor health conditions. TBZ and other institutions have failed in creating rural employment opportunities and in increasing the quantity and coverage of poor farmers' income. Thus the standard of living in rural areas, especially in the outlying areas, has remained generally low and has even worsened after independence.

We travelled to those villages and tried to collect data. We talked with the people. The questions were structured and open. In total 50 farmers were interviewed, 14 in Kalale, 18 in Kazo and 18 in Njonjolo. Kalale has a favourable geographical position as it is situated along the Kaoma-Lusaka road. It appeared from our survey that there is more intra-village household income variation than inter-village. The most important explaining factor could be the geographical situation: distance from the tobacco scheme. Kalale area can be mentioned as a good example. Even some villagers in this area have casual and permanent farm labourers (clients) who work on the farm. The majority of patrons are village headmen. Of the interviewed farmers, 30 used modern means for agricultural inputs, of which 12 were from Kalale, 12 were from Kazo and 6 were from Njonjolo.

Participation in the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme in the form of short contracts, piece work and others (hired by assisted tenant farmers) was done by 13 farmers: 8 from Kalale, 5 from Kazo and zero from Njonjolo. More than 50% of the interviewed people were aware of the presence of the scheme: 12 of them in Kalale, 12 in Kazo and 5 in Njonjolo. Among those farmers who produce cash crops, none of them are satisfied with the price policy of the government. The majority of the farmers said that their culture has changed dramatically, for instance: '... dowry is becoming very expensive and as a result marriages are not granted. Initiation ceremonies used to take place for more than a month in the past. This time it is even less than a week-one of the reasons why marriages are breaking very soon...' Many of them gave the following answer about the relation between children, parents and grand-parents: '... those days you could send your children everywhere without any payment. Children respected their parents, elders and grands [check]. Nowadays, they are disobedient. If one sends his child to collect honey in the bush he will sell it secretly in Nkeyema and comes back with empty hands and the same is happening with hunting. Many of the farmers use the same phrase by saying 'it is Zambia', meaning things have changed, some said even it is 'modern'...'.

In the last decades fundamental changes have taken place in Nkeyema and the surrounding areas. Some Nkoya peasants have migrated to the new, growing rural towns, Nkeyema and Kaoma. Others migrate mostly during the agricultural season. Hundreds of Nkoya peasants have settled permanently in Nkeyema and probably thousands in Kaoma town. Most of them have settled along the Lusaka-Kaoma road. According to the councillor of Nkeyema, Mr. R. M. Kachama: '...these new peasant migrants are creating problems in the area. The land which they occupy belongs to Nkeyema Council. They have settled without the permission of the council. We reserve the land for those who want to open business and are able to build 'normal houses'. But these 'illegal' settlers or squatters (as they are called by many people in Nkeyema) build simple houses and live. A case is already on the way to get them away...' The migration of peasants from the outlying areas to Nkeyema and Kaoma town shall continue as long as there are no rural facilities. This leads us to the discussion of the emergence of the class situation in Kaoma district in general and in Nkeyema area in particular.

6.6 Class formation and rural proletarianisation

In any analysis of class situations, there are at least two categories of people with different and opposing views on economic, social, political, and cultural phenomena. In Kaoma district, the assisted tenant farmers were in most respects the superior farmers. They were given a preferential treatment by the Tobacco Board of Zambia as compared to the family farmers. For instance, in times of fuel scarcity, priority was given to the assisted tenant farmers.

Many villagers have been involved in wage labour. The construction of the Lusaka-Kaoma road was one area where the peasants in Kaoma district sold their labour (Nelson-Richards 1988). In the case of the road construction the government was the employer. After the completion of the road, all workers were laid off. This situation created a lack of continuity, because the workers were not absorbed into the other construction-related activities. These workers were initially part of the peasant group. Their lack of employment in road construction forced them to find other jobs, usually with rich farmers. This class differentiation was again reinforced with the introduction of a modern agricultural system. The stratification is more economic and financial and less socio-political in structures as seen from the traditional standpoint. The construction of the Lusaka-Kaoma road and the introduction of modern agricultural inputs, and especially tobacco cultivation (which needs much labour), have contributed to the formation of a rural proletariat dependent on agriculture wage and casual labour. Thus, a class proletarians has come into being as well as a class peasantry that ostensibly depend on the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme and on a richer class of peasant farmers for a substantial part of its subsistence.

The Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme brought unequal system for distributing the means of production. Therefore, the emergence of a class situation the stratification in the area was an intrinsic result of Zambia's capitalist agricultural policy. It was and still is the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme which controls and owns the land. But the means of production (agricultural equipment and other inputs) are no longer under the control of the scheme, since the scheme has stopped assisting the family farmers and the assisted tenant farmers both in the production of tobacco and maize. Currently, rich individual farmers have replaced the assisted tenants since 1980s, but the family farmers who were able to continue running their farm are still active.

The rapid rate of migration, especially of the retired urban elites who came to benefit from the expansion of wealth because of the agricultural commercialisation in the district, has also contributed to the stratification of the peasantry. The rise of co-operatives and lending institutions have reinforced the situation. Agricultural inputs were and still are allocated to those who are already better-off.

Plate 4.

Plate 5.

6.7 The role of Co-operatives and lending institutions

Some ten years after the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme various institutions were established in Nkeyema to also offer loan facilities and social services on a broader base; notably worth mentioning are the Lima Bank Limited, Nkeyema Multi-purpose Co-operative Society and the Credit Unions and Savings Association. The last two are situated in Nkeyema and the first one has a temporary office in Nkeyema while its permanent office is in Kaoma town.

a) Lima Bank Limited

The Lima Bank Limited, formerly called the Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) was and is still a specialised agricultural credit institution which offers financial services to farmers. Lima Bank was established in 1987 to take over the assets, liabilities and functions of both the AFC and the Zambia Agricultural Development Bank (ZADB). The recent liberalisation and privatisation policy of the country has both positive and negative impacts on the policy of Lima Bank. The degree of commercialisation it should enjoy and the sector of the farming community it should concentrate on are the few positive signs for the future development of the Bank. According to Lima Bank Branch manager in Kaoma: ‘.. we still face numerous dilemmas because of the unclear government’s monetary policy ...’

The Lima Bank is the only institution in the area which has at least strict lending conditions for farmers. It offers loans mainly to the progressive farmers. It has trained personnel in its fields of operation and offers close supervision. But the Bank still faces many problems, mainly in its inability to achieve loan recovery, financial problems and staffing problems. The following has been reported in the Executive Members meeting of Kaoma District Farmers Association on November 6, 1993. Of the 46,157 bags of white maize (1 bag = 90 kg) bought by the Lima Bank from the farmers; only less than 50% has been paid to the farmers until 5-11-93. The high interest rate of the Bank is also one of the major problems. The interest rate went up to 120% from 1-6-93 to 30-9-93.¹¹⁾

b) Nkeyema Multi-purpose Co-operative Society

The Nkeyema Multi-purpose Co-operative Society was registered on the 22nd of September, 1982. All local co-operative societies together form local Co-operative Union, on a district level there exist Provincial Co-operative Unions, and finally there is the Zambia Co-operative Federation (ZCF) on a national level. The Co-operative Society is an intermediary between ZCF and the farmers in and around Nkeyema. After receiving supplies from the district co-operative union it distributes these to all categories of farmers. The supplies include; empty produce bags, fertilisers, and seeds.

The Nkeyema Co-operative Society consists of a manager, a book-keeper, a secretary, three watchmen, two depot buyers, and many general workers. According to the manager of the society, Mr. Chikamba: ‘.. collecting back the loans given to the farmers remains a very big problem. From the ZK48,000,000 provided by the society, only 21% was collected. * The rest ZK32,000,000 should be yet collected ..’ Mr. Chikamba explains further: ‘...Farmers have high expectations of the prices and as a result they are delaying the sale of their agricultural produce...’

* Currency equivalent, November 1993: 355 Zambian Kwacha (ZK) = 1 US dollar

When he was asked about the recent liberalisation of the market by the government, he replied: ‘...the policy allows the farmers to sell their crops anywhere and to anybody they like, and this creates another problem for us to collect the loans given because it is very unlikely that the farmers will come on their own initiative to pay back their loans...’

However, to us, this seems unlikely, because in the first place the majority of the farmers are not producing enough to enable them to transport their produce to somewhere else in search for better price, and in the second place many farmers have no access at all to transport facilities.

Farmers have to fulfil certain pre-conditions in order to get access to resources. The following requirements are needed:

a) A farmer has to be a member of the co-operative society and live in or around Nkeyema.

b) He should pay ZK8,000 in advance .

If a farmer wants to plough a plot of one hectare, he needs the following items:

-2 bags of seeds each 10 kg = 20 kg	
price per bag	ZK 8,220
total price	ZK 16,440
-8 bags of fertiliser each 50 kg = 400 kg	
price per bag	ZK 87,68
total price	ZK 70,144

-Total loan for seeds and fertilisers = ZK 86,584

The interest rate (December 1994: 48%) should also be added to the total amount.

According to the co-operative management it has excess of stock in store. One of the main reasons for this excess is that many farmers are not able to pay ZK8,000 in advance. The majority are too poor to pay this amount of money, so they cannot buy the co-operative’s supplies. Another problem is that the co-operative union does not have its own transportation to distribute supplies to outlying areas like Kazo and Njonjolo. We were able to observe this problem personally. The farmers were waiting for supplies and seeking for transportation, but unfortunately they did not succeed until the end of January, when it was too late to apply fertilisers, let alone sow.

The manager of the co-operative union worried greatly about the delays in the payment of loans by the farmers, especially with regard to those who misuse the supplies and not put them in production. After receiving supplies from the institutions, some farmers sell their supplies to other people at a much lower price. Some sell it just to obtain alcohol and other related things; a very big problem in this area. Therefore, they are unable to repay their loans. Rich farmers take advantage of this and stimulate the situation. There were also many problems which might be experienced by every individual farmer. Many farmers lack cash to pay their labourers. They need money to transport their supplies, to send their children to school, to buy uniforms, etc. They also do not get paid quickly for their produce. As a result, much money was wasted, and co-operatives and farmers were discouraged rather than encouraged to become self-reliant. Production was not enhanced and many of the co-operatives failed to achieve their initial goals. The co-operative has bought 33,714 bags of white maize from the farmers on a credit basis but has not been able to pay the farmers three months after delivery.

The co-operative management does not have a solution for the many problems. They suggest that a social worker might be useful, who can give regular advice and training to the farmers, especially those who do not use their supplies properly. The problem is actually beyond the reach of the local co-operative society. It is too complex to think of solutions on a micro level alone. The management itself does not have a strict lending policy. This offers opportunities for misuse and misappropriation of supplies. The long tier system makes the problem very complicated as it is highly centralised. ZCF in Lusaka distributes supplies to the provincial co-operative union who then distributes them to district co-operative unions and finally to the local co-operative societies. The channel is too long to reach the farmers in time. Lenders are not checked for whether they are known as established farmers or ordinary dealers. Some employees also grant loans to ghost farmers — farmers who do not exist but who collect supplies under false names. From the point of view of many farmers in the area, the various programmes aimed at increasing their capacity for productive engagement have failed to reach them. They think that all the programmes are a deliberate camouflage to obscure their exploitation and consequent exclusion from sharing fairly in the available resources and benefits of the co-operative society. Many officials are apathetic to their problems.

Extension workers were supposed to be innovative, eager to work and able to make decisions in response to the needs of the rural population. The government agricultural extension workers work with those farmers who possess the potential to increase production. This appeared to be true in our research when we visited the villages outside of Nkeyema. Most of the villagers haven't seen the extension workers for several years. They are completely excluded from production and occupational development projects, because they have virtually nothing to start with. Accordingly, they remain poor.

c) Credit Unions and Savings Association.

The Credit Unions and Savings Association (CUSA) is a non-profit organisation. It encourages co-operative savings and the establishment of Co-operative Savings and Credit societies, Provincial Credit Unions, District Credit Unions and Local Credit Unions. It gives loans at controlled rates of interest exclusively for provident and production purposes. The Nkeyema Service and Credit Union Limited was established in August 1988. It renders services to all categories of farmers. To be a member, one needs to fulfil the following requirements:

- a) ZK100 should be paid as a registration fee;
- b) A deposit of at least K1000 or more must be paid.

CUSA gives three types of loans: for machinery for agricultural purposes and for personal purposes. For machinery, such as hammer mills, pickups, motor cycles, tractors etc. One has to pay a deposit of 30% of the price to the society if one wants to buy one of these items. For furniture, dowry and marriage ceremonies a 5% deposit, and for agricultural loans a 10% deposit has to be paid. The institution seems to be rather decentralised to tell from the recent reorganisation. The long channel of a four tier system has been replaced by a two tier system, so there is a direct connection between the local and the head office.¹²⁾

The re-organisation (the two tier system) has not been an improvement. During our stay in Nkeyema we were able to observe how the management was functioning. Corruption and abuse of office are still common practices. There is no control at all from above. We came to know that no auditing has been carried out by the head office for a very long time. Inefficiency is added to a broad range of problems. The main problem is the incessant feuding among the co-operative members for control and dominance. The co-operatives have become battle grounds for fights between the better-off farmers and the poor ones with little or no opportunities. These feuds do not correspond to the objectives of peasant participation in development, since the poor farmers are excluded from sharing not only in decision-making, but also in the benefits of lending institutions such as CUSA.

It may be suggested that the impediments of rural development are many and complex. One can observe in Kaoma district, particularly in Nkeyema that the leaders of different agencies have used the opportunities they had for individual mobility. Most of these people live in a good house compared to the local situation, had attended either college or university earlier in their life, worked in government or private organisations and had finally become heads of local and regional institutions.

The local bureaucracies and development organisations are weak and incapable to foster development. They neglect to implement local policies. Most of the bureaucrats have their own businesses. The project manager of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, for instance, in addition to his responsibility as manager, also runs a private business. He transports people o Kaoma town and the surrounding villages by using (the scheme's?) pickup. At least three times a week and sometimes two to three times a day, he travels to Kaoma. The transportation price is more than double that of the normal national transportation tariff. He can do this partly because of the absence of regular public transportation facilities in the area.

Almost all employees of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme have their own farms, varying in size from 100 ha. to a minimum of 12 ha. of arable land. There are hardly any mechanisms to control whether the employees are using the scheme's machinery for their own purposes. The assistant project manager of the scheme owns a grinding mill near the scheme. Some of the tobacco scheme's employees even employ permanent agricultural workers. Therefore, by entering the private market, rather than fulfilling their responsibility as employees, they earn money by running personal businesses. The co-operative staff members in the district and especially those in Nkeyema have prospered themselves by using the resources of the co-operative. Two members of the co-operative have been able to build houses for themselves. The one owns a grocery store and the other has a restaurant-bar.

Cultural values also play a significant role. Having more than one wife is a sign wealth. Wealth enables a man to marry more than one wife. One of the employees of the co-operative has three wives. Two of them live in a separate house. The other one has two wives. The project manager of the scheme has two wives, who share the same house. Together they have eleven children and seven dependants, and this make the total number of the family twenty-one. In general the officials in the area also spend a lot of money on alcohol and other related things.

The shortcomings of development agencies in Kaoma district can be summarised as follows:

- a) The agencies have an inefficient loan administration;
- b) They lack a trained staff, and the few well-trained staff members do not perform well;
- c) Loan applications are not looked into well and consequently wrong decisions are often made ;
- d) Lack of transportation and other facilities hinders the scant supervision efforts; Transportation costs have become so high that the production costs of cash crops are higher than their market value. Because of the uncomfortable price little produce is sold. The crops are left to rot away, since there are no silos in which to store the crops;
- e) There is no constructive interaction between the head office, the local institutions and the farmers. This interaction could have reduced the problems and, for example have led to a better contact between lenders and borrowers and possibly to a higher loan recovery rate;
- f) The flow of information is very limited. A better supply of information would have created a better understanding with the local farmers of the issue and essence of lending, how to use the money properly and how to pay back the loans;
- g) The interest rate is very high to the discontent of the majority of the farmers.

The following table shows the rates of interest for the years 1990-93.

Table 6. Rate of interest from 1990-93

	CUSA	ZCF	Lima Bank
1990	18%	28%	39%
1991	20%	36%	43%
1992	40%	43%	47%
1993	47%	48%	95% *

Source: Lima Bank, Kaoma Branch, 1993.

CUSA, Nkeyema Branch., 1993.

ZCF, Nkeyema Branch, 1993.

* The rate of interest for Lima Bank over 1993 is the average for the whole year.

N.B. The exchange rate for the month January, 1994 700 Zambian Kwacha (ZK) = 1 US dollar.

The concrete realities of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme witnesses the role of modern agriculture in socio-economic development in Central Western Zambia for the last twenty years. The following chapter tries to illustrate this issue.

VII. The Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme

The Government of the Republic of Zambia set up a tobacco production scheme at Nkeyema in Kaoma district in 1971. The scheme itself was placed under a statutory board, the Tobacco Board of Zambia (TBZ). The government undertook a programme of setting up a tobacco infrastructure. This included building roads, opening up farms, curing structures, personnel accommodation and other related capital work.

The Zambian government aimed at developing tobacco production to a commercial level. The government also intended, through the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, to increase maize production to a level that would exceed local demand. With the establishment of Assisted Tenant Schemes and Family Farming Schemes the government hoped:

- a) to encourage the production of tobacco on a large scale for commercial producers as well as the small-scale family farmers in order to promote rural development in all its facets;
- b) to promote and maintain rising incomes and rising standards of living among the rural population;
- c) to increase the production of tobacco as a significant contribution to government earnings of foreign exchange. Zambia's dependence on copper only makes this more than a necessary.

7.1 Recruitment, Training and Education

In order to prepare the prospective farmers it was necessary to train and educate them. After being recruited from all over the country, the assisted tenant farmers were sent to Agricultural Training Colleges in the southern province Popota and in the central province Mukonchi. The training colleges were run by the Tobacco Board of Zambia. Academic subjects like soil science, tobacco technology, business management, farm budgeting, costing and enterprise, finance, surveying, conservation etc. were taught. The assisted tenant farmers also attended different kinds of workshops, doing practical activities and were encouraged to create a sense of love for manual labour in all farming activities.

After completing the training, 18 assisted tenant farmers started their agricultural activities in the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. The Tobacco Board of Zambia, through its management resident on the scheme, provided a mechanisation service to the assisted tenant farmers; an accounting service for the seasonal and medium-term loans, and it arranged the bulk purchase of requisites such as fertilisers and seeds and also the transportation of the crop to Lusaka where it is sold under the individual assisted tenant farmer's registration number.

The assisted tenant farmers grew 20 acres of tobacco and 80 acres of maize in the first year and were expected to increase the acreage of tobacco to 40 acres within a 5-year period. The Board provided the funds for initial development, including the building of barns, and housing but the assisted tenant farmer was encouraged to invest his own profits in the further development of his farm as he increased his acreage of tobacco and maize. The Board also provided the assisted tenant farmers with modern means of production such as tractor hire unit near by, bore holes, labour houses, and it helped to clear additional land of about 60 ha.

The Zambian government also hoped to promote regional economic development and the social benefits to the people in the area. With development aid from the World Bank TBZ established Family Farming Schemes in Nkeyema. Basically, TBZ provided management and extension services to family farmers who grew one acre of tobacco and two acres of maize in the first year, with the probability that the growers would increase their production capacity, especially of tobacco, between two and three acres over a 5-year period. The scheme management at Nkeyema grew the seedlings for the growers, the growers then did everything else, including the curing in small, cheaply-made barns, the grading and the tying of tobacco. The management then received the tobacco at conveniently spaced classification and baling centres where the grower was issued with a receipt for each grade of tobacco he delivered. The tobacco was bulked, baled and the management arranged its sale. The family farmer was paid the average value of the grade of tobacco delivered to the baling centre minus the seasonal and medium-term loans have been issued to him and a service charge to cover management handling costs.

The family farmers were given training on the spot. None of this category of farmers went to the agricultural college. In the first year of joining the scheme, the family farmers were under close

supervision and were taught modern methods of agriculture and soil conservation, and thereafter they continued to receive regular technical assistance from trained agricultural demonstrators. The family farmers acquired 12 ha. of uncleared land each. For those who would prove to be successful, the management promised to increase their hectareage up to 90 ha. The lease had a duration of 14 years. The assisted tenant farmers acquired about 250 ha. of arable land for 99 years and were grouped for easy administration and in such a way that the neighbourhood could share a common water supply.

The majority of the family farmers were not native inhabitants in the area, but refugees who lived far away from the scheme. Although the scheme's effort was in line with the political aspiration of the party and the government to develop the region and the social life of the community, it was not easy for the scheme management to recruit as many farmers as they had wanted to run the project. In some cases, the scheme had not given priority to who would be or would not be recruited, but was more attention given to the production of tobacco for export. Above all, the management had very little time to convince the local people to become engaged in farming.

Many native villagers were not familiar with farming activities. For the local people it was also very difficult socially as well as emotionally to leave their families and community and settle five or six kilometres away from their village. Culturally they were not used to produce for the market either. Doing business was essentially unknown to the local people, so growing for the market was not easy. Some villagers even felt that growing for the market was a European attitude. Nevertheless, there were some native people who joined the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme.

The Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme management recruited the family farmers from refugee camp near Kaoma town, a place called Mayukwayukwa. Many of the refugees were from the neighbouring country of Angola who had fled the country from the war of liberation against Portugal since 1966 and later, after independence from the civil war fought between the central government MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação [check] de Angola) and the guerrilla movement UNITA (União [check] Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) under the leadership of J. Savimbi. The refugees belonged to an ethnic group called the Luvale. The majority of Angolan refugees chose to settle themselves in Zambian border villages rather than to be settled in government-administered locations where they would receive assistance. The Luvale-speaking people lived in this part of Zambia before 1820, after they had entered Zambia because of the wars with the Mbwela (Papstein 1979). The majority of the Luvale-speaking and related peoples in Zambia before 1966 were first and second generation immigrants or earlier refugees from Angola between the early 1910s and the 1930s (Hansen 1982). Therefore, the early migrants provided both direction and welcome to the many refugees after 1966. Many Angolans who came as refugees at that time, therefore, had an opportunity to identify and locate relatives who had migrated earlier to Zambia. For refugees who had no relatives in Zambian villages, it was too hard working for food all the time, so they went to a government settlement project (the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme) where the government would help them. The Luvale people settled in Northern and Western province of Zambia, especially.


7.2 Organisation and Services of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme

At Nkeyema, living accommodations and quarters were made available for different categories of the scheme's employees. The assisted tenant farmers and the family farmers were provided with many items to use in the production of tobacco, wheel barrows, hoes, axes, iron sheets, wires, pipes, thermometers, shovels, fertilisers, tobacco seedlings, etc. Other services, like ploughing, disk harrowing and ridging were also rendered. For proper efficiency each block (section) had a tractor and a bore hole for all water purposes and an extension officer. Prior to receiving these items and services, each farmer had to sign an application and to agree with the stipulated conditions that each farmer had to comply with. Among the many conditions, each farmer was not entitled to take more than two consecutive years without growing tobacco. Secondly, every farmer had to grow eucalyptus trees on his farm.

Organisationally, the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme is characterised by a pyramidal structure. The objectives of both management in Kaoma and Lusaka were not identical, but the structures were alike except that of Lusaka's structure was more elaborate. In the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme, there were many managers and assistant managers, section managers and section assistant managers to do the same jobs. The hierarchical structure of both organisations is illustrated in the next page.

Below the resident manager at the scheme is the deputy manger who was also the manager of the family farmers, and his status was the same as the manager of the assisted tenant farmers. Below these managers was the manager of the Direct Production Unit, a farm owned and run by the scheme management as an economic exercise for profit. This manager was not answerable to the resident manager at the scheme, but was in direct contact with the administration headquarters in Lusaka. The deputy managers had their supportive staff, which included a typist, an accountant, a book-keeper, etc. The assistant managers carried out the duties of the deputy managers in their absence. The section managers and section assistants, both of them extension officers, were next in the pecking order. Finally, at the bottom, we find the agricultural workers and the general workers, both of whom are on the same level horizontally.

Diagram II



KEY:

A= Resident Managers
 B1= Deputy Managers and Managers of the Family Farmers
 B2= Managers of the Assisted tenants
 C= Supportive Staff
 C1= Assistant to the Deputy Managers

C2= Assistant to Managers of the Assisted tenants
 D1= Section Managers
 D2= Section Assistants
 E1= Agricultural Workers
 E2= General Workers

Diagram III

7.3 The farmers and their labour strategy

As agricultural systems undergo commercialisation, all aspects of those systems (hybrid seeds, insecticides, farm equipment, etc.) the household economies and the socio-cultural system itself should adjust to the new goals of production. Large scale organisation such as the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme operate on a number of levels. The operating decisions taken at one level become the constraints on the other actors at lower levels of the organisation. I shall try to consider here one of the elements in adjusting labour requirements: the changing role of labour and the trends of how different types of labour are organised when farmers commercialise or are confronted with cash crop agricultural activities. Over-supply or under supply of labour may be one of the critical causes when agriculture becomes mechanised. What are the mechanisms to overcome this instability? What is of interest here, which requires exploration, what is the extent to which these mechanisms of adjusting labour supplies and demands have been retained, reformed or simply abandoned when traditional farmers commercialise? And above all, what does it mean for the majority of the farmers who are not capable of transferring to commercial agriculture?

I use the term labour strategy to describe the mix of different types of labour with which the assisted tenant farmers and family farmers carried out their tenancy. For the assisted tenant farmers there are three categories of labour available: paid labour from outside the village of Nkeyema, labourers from Nkeyema and members of the tenant's family. Some assisted tenant farmers used labour exclusively from outside the village. Others used a few, constant workers from the village. The workers were probably associated with the assisted tenant farmer for some years. These workers may or may not be related to him. The assisted tenant farmers and the family farmers were expected to produce crops as prescribed by the scheme management. This discouraged the farmers. They were unmotivated to go to a big hectareage as they could not grow crops on their own. This was not the only factor which limited the farmers' production planning. The farmers also had a feeling that they were regarded as government production workers and not as master on their own plots. As a consequence of these factors, the capacity of production in general and tobacco in particular was reduced. Many family farmers have left the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. We were not able to trace the exact number, but some estimated that of the participants from the native population whose number were fifty four, or more than 66% of them were not able to run their farm as a result of several problems they faced. TBZ and other organisations which replaced TBZ failed to overcome the previous problems. Of the 18 assisted tenant farmers, only 2 are currently active, the rest have stopped farming for different reasons. I shall come back on this point the constraints that the farmers had.

The assisted tenant farmer in the Nkeyema tobacco scheme was responsible for the provision of labour on his tenancy. He was supposed to operate with hired workers in order to earn profits. Contrary to the assisted tenant farmer, the family farmer was not allowed to hire labour. Instead, his only source of labour were his own family members. However, the scheme did not concern itself with the way in which labour input was supplied. Theoretically, the idea (from the point of view of the scheme management) was that labour would be organised on calculative and non-affective assumptions, more or less in line with the capitalist mode of production. The assisted tenant farmers were allowed to hire 18 labourers to work with 24.26 hectares of maize and 8.94 hectares of tobacco during harvest time. This number of labourers, according to the assisted tenant farmers themselves was absolutely inadequate. The family farmer did not have any access to loans to hire labour and was dependent upon his own labour. Further, he was supposed to be able to supply the labour input for his tenancy from his own family.

The way in which the assisted tenant farmers and the family farmers organised the labour input on their tenancy is crucial both to the understanding of their life situation in general and the class structure of the village. Both had to reconcile their position as producers in an organisation to a rationalised cash economy and ultimately to a world commodity market with the demands upon them of their life cycle and their social position in the village society. When one talks of family labour one is speaking of the labour potential of the nuclear family, but the tobacco scheme management has recruited those farmers (especially the family farmers) who were monogamous and even single. Chayanov, in an attempt to formulate a theory of peasant economy, made the essential contribution of recognising the household, or family farm as the basis of peasant production. His principal contribution (1966) was to attempt a synthesis of main factors determining the development of agricultural systems and thereby of social relations in agriculture. Chayanov analysed the relationships between population density and organisation forms in agriculture: '...agricultural development is not determined by any

single factor as market or social relations. Social relations in the village are complex and differ from one region to another ...' (1966: LXVI).

The growth and development of the household provides labour through the reproduction of children. Therefore, the amount of labour product seems to be determined by the size and composition of the working family and the number of its members capable of work. The rate of expansion of the composition of family labour may also be related to how the family farmer manages to overcome his labour shortage. Demographic differentiation or disparities as family size are not always decisive motive forces to enhance production, especially if one equates the concept of family in rural society with the biological concept. In his work, Chayanov, showed the variation in family size; not only the biological nature of the family, but also the variation in family size. One can have more than one wife, united in a single complex family (1966:54).

Some family farmers in the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme have succeeded to use labour from outside their family. Those who were confronted with a labour shortage, sought for another source of labour. An alternative option was to invite relatives and to settle them in the same compound where the family farmer lived. The relatives carried out the roles and responsibilities assigned to the family farmer. The family farmer would have to do anything to keep the whole extended family together. Only very few managed to use this type of labour strategy, as the majority of the family farmers were not from the surrounding area and their material and educational background did not allow them to resort to this strategy.

Taking the family farmer and his nuclear family as the basic production-consumption unit, it is obvious that there are demographic constraints on the way in which labour can be organised. This means that family composition primarily defines the upper and lower limits of the volume of economic activity. On this respect the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme was faced with negative experiences and the scheme management reported in 1973 that the recruitment was not as favourable as it had been expected: '...some of the farmers were found to have no wives or families to help them with their work and in order to get the crops reaped ...' ¹³⁾ These farmers received excessive credits and so made small profits eventually.

The simple fact is that the family farmer can only have a son or sons of the appropriate age for the heavy work involved in tobacco and maize growing for a certain period of his life. This has an effect on the production output. The contribution of unpaid labour to the work of the family farmer is, then, very restricted. This fact is in conflict with the ideology of the scheme management that the family farmer's family could supply an appreciable part of his labour requirements. As I have mentioned earlier only very few had the opportunity to have access to another source of labour.

The scheme operated as an element within the capitalist system of production and exchange. The implication is that success depended on the organisation being a perfect machine for combining labour with other factors of production. But the scheme was shaped by the whim or personality of those who controlled it. The scheme can be identified by the following features;

- a) Any problems which arose were solved from the top without any consultation of the farmers;
- b) Interaction within the management was very hierarchical and vertical;
- c) The management was operating under a simple control system.

The management did very little to supervise and follow the developments of each farmers, so that success and failure of every farmer could be discovered at the right time and corrective measures could be taken when necessary. Organisationally, the scheme still remains much as it was since the 1970s when it was established. The core productive processes of the scheme have hardly altered, and even worsened, in over twenty years. The basic structural features the relationship of authority and control, the determination of policy remain the same, highly mechanistic and hierarchical despite the recent changes in socio-economic policy in the country as a whole.

7.4 Concrete situation and realities of the farmers under TBZ.

The government supplied the land and capital. The assisted tenant farmer's role was that of supplying the labour input for the productive process. He supplied this in the form of his own labour and through the employment of labourers. The assisted tenant farmer mobilised his informal links and other extra-organisational social links in order to recruit and use labour. He could not chose what main crop he grew, he could not chose when to plant and when to harvest, he had no say in the area of cultivation. The assisted tenant farmer's effective decisions were almost entirely restricted (what combination of

labour types to use and which tasks the labourers he employed were expected to do). In short, the entire nature of the Tobacco Board of Zambia created the situation for him. His area of decision-making was aimed more at reconciling the external constraints to his life situation than making production decisions. His life resembled the industrial wage-labourer. If the assisted tenant farmers were to be considered to be capable of taking a greater part in the management of the scheme, then large numbers of officials would become redundant and this had never been reconsidered until the scheme almost winded itself up.

The government of Zambia pumped an initial finance of more than ten million Kwacha into the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme * and the Barclays Bank of Zambia Limited gave a seasonal loan of thirty-five thousand Kwacha at eight percent interest to the assisted tenant farmers until the government decided not to guarantee these loans (Nelson-Richards 1988:52). TBZ rendered service to the farmers until 1981. Of the 18 assisted tenant farmers 12 failed to continue farming. At the time when TBZ pulled out it was noted that only 6 assisted tenant farmers managed to retain their farms due to good performance because they had paid off their loans. According to an assisted tenant farmer, Mr. S. Mulumba: '... lack of confidence among the assisted tenant farmers, misusing of labour wages on drinking, for example, was one of the issues which led them to register non-existing labourers on their payroll on which their financiers based payments...' Misuse of machinery was also another contributing factor. Mr. Mulumba explains further: '...some farmers used their tractor for public transport instead of using them for farming purposes. Lack of knowledge and experience was also a big problem....'

Among the many farmers whom I discussed with, it was only Mr. Mulumba who has maintained that bad performance was the fault of the farmers, while the rest put the blame exclusively on the tobacco scheme management. Mr. L. Mulenga and Mr. B.P. Shamilimo (both of them tenant farmers) blame the poor marketing policy of the government, and the late delivery of inputs. Other tenant farmers argue that problem arose when TBZ pulled out from Nkeyema which resulted in shortages of machinery and lack of tractors. TBZ took a lot of farming equipment back to Lusaka and those left behind were mostly broken. The farmers felt alienated, their dissatisfaction was a result of the lack of continuity in the scheme management system as a whole. TBZ could no longer guarantee the loans of the farmers and the banks stopped giving them credits. Many tenant farmers complained that the scheme management was the main obstacle. Even when loans were available they were on seasonal and not on a long term-basis.

The causes for the failure of the family farmers are almost identical to those of the assisted tenant farmers. As has been mentioned earlier, TBZ invested more money in the project against lack of education, experience and training of the family farmers. Virtual free service was rendered to the farmers in the beginning. However, expenses were very high when compared to the farmers' output. Mr. Ngimbu (a family farmer) blamed the re-organisation of TBZ and its take-over by the Department of Agriculture. Many more family farmers complained that the scheme had let them down or deserted them.

Other problems mentioned were that the costs for hiring tractors and for inputs skyrocketed due to the devaluation of the country's currency, but not in proportion when compared to the costs of production. When TBZ pulled out there were about 381 family farmers. Currently their number has been reduced to 200. The main reason why so many farmers have given up and left their farms was that they could no longer manage to grow tobacco because of a lack of credit for inputs. Mr. Mukumbi (family farmer) indicates: '... I reached a stage where I decided to do away with modern agriculture and resort to traditional crops like cassava, sorghum and others which do not require fertilisers...' Many other farmers share the same view. This means that the presence of the scheme has not resulted in an autonomous community of the Nkeyema village.

* Currency equivalent, July 1976: 1 Zambian Kwacha (ZK) = 1 US dollar

Both the assisted tenant farmers and the family farmers faced problems, for instance the difficulty in agriculture of calculating a net income, and particularly of identifying interest rates, gross income, money spent for capital reproduction and for the whole process of production, family maintenance, savings, etc. The scheme on its part lacked effective co-ordination and this made the execution troublesome. In broader historical terms the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme can not be considered as a successful example for integrated rural development, as the government had hoped. On the contrary, it was stagnant, held very little hope for the local people in terms of continually rising living standards, and it actually exposed the economy, and thus the society, to potentially considerable instability.

7.5 The Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme and the effects of re-organisation

With the formation of the Tobacco Board of Zambia in 1968 and later the establishment of Assisted Tenant Schemes and Family Farming Schemes, the government had hoped to increase the production capacity of tobacco for export. TBZ did not achieve much due to lack of funds when the financing from the World Bank came to an end.¹⁴⁾ But as we have observed it was not only lack of finance, but also lack of management quality, sense of devotion, conscientiousness and responsibility that played a significant role. The management, both in Kaoma and Lusaka showed very little sympathy and understanding necessary to realise such an integrated development plan: in order to work with traditional farmers there needs to be tolerance, a rigid discipline and especially patience. The first scheme manager reported in 1974: ‘...communications with the Headquarters in Lusaka remained very poor...’¹⁵⁾

In 1981, the government of Zambia decided to re-organise TBZ as it was thought that the organisation could not increase production in its present form. The department of Agriculture (under the ministry of Agriculture, Land and Fisheries) assumed responsibility for promoting production. The 1980-81 harvest season was experienced by many farmers as a slap in the face. Many producers suffered heavy losses. The re-organisation had many consequences, not only for the farmers, but also for the staff members. During this period, the scheme lost 10 members. Others were transferred to the Department of Agriculture. Some emotional farmers left their farms as they feared this was probably the end of the scheme. The income of the workers in the Department of Agriculture was reduced compared what they had earned at TBZ by about 50%. A planning officer who had earned K660 at TBZ had to accept K324 from the Department of Agriculture. The Department was responsible for former personnel.

The Agricultural Finance Company (AFC) took on the responsibility of financing both categories of farmers. Soon AFC also came in financial difficulties. A German company ‘Gebrüder [**check** **Gebrüder**] Koln [**check** **Köln**] Kampf’ (GKK) provided agronomists and extension officers for tobacco growers. The Company was the main buyer of Zambian and Southern African tobacco. GKK was operating alongside the Department of Agriculture in organising loans and inputs for tobacco growers only, while AFC concentrated solely on maize growers. The main purpose of GKK was to buy ungraded tobacco from the farmers and then grade it in Lusaka. Under TBZ farmers had to grade their tobacco themselves. At the end of the harvest season GKK bought the entire tobacco production in the area from the farmers and transported it to Lusaka. The delivery was on credit basis and the farmers received loans from the company. GKK refused to pay the farmers for their crop. It has been said that GKK could not cover their expenses because of the loans to the farmers. We have tried to have this confirmed in Lusaka by the management of NATCO (National Tobacco Company) but I was informed that the management knew nothing about this affair. GKK is currently not active anymore in Zambia. It was not possible for me to find the necessary documents about this case in order to trace the previous developments. As the secretary of TBZ¹⁴⁾ has informed us, many documents were destroyed when TBZ pulled out and was replaced by the Department of Agriculture. The Board secretary added: ‘...the agricultural policy of the country has never been favourable for the country’s development. In previous years, the general policy of the government and the party (UNIP) was not good. Farmers had the idea that government money belonged to them and as a result there was no need for paying back loans. The so-called humanism, the ideology of the former government failed to realise its goals. Those days of subsidising have weakened the economy...’ The Board secretary pointed at the always manipulated currency of the country: ‘...at times when farmers have made ready their harvest for sale and take the crops to the market, the price goes down immediately and the farmers are not able sometimes to cover the cost of production self. In 1992\93 harvest season, many tobacco growers in southern province have

burnt their crops as the result of the worst decline in the tobacco price. This occurred while the interest rates were going up, partly as a result of an economic liberalisation and privatisation policy...'

As we have stated earlier, TBZ is no more a financier. The name 'Assisted Tenant Farmer' does no longer exist. Twelve of them have given up and four have died. Only two are still active in Nkeyema. The further decline of the production has led to the formation of the National Tobacco Company (NATCO) in 1985. NATCO is a liability company with two shareholders. The primary shareholder is the Ministry of Finance and the minor one is the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Fisheries. The permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture is the Chairman of the Board.

The objectives of NATCO were set as follows:

- a) Encouragement of small-scale farmers;
- b) Provision of extension services;
- c) Processing and export of tobacco.

NATCO's role in the new set-up was to facilitate government participation in the production, marketing, processing and future development of the tobacco industry. NATCO replaced the Department of Agriculture and continued running the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme with the ex-staff members of TBZ. For a few years there was little progress in the tobacco production in the area. Later the production of tobacco went down. During the period of NATCO, there were not enough tractors and machinery and, above all, many farmers had already stopped growing tobacco and had gone over to growing other crops. The new company, did not escape the problem either that the earlier organisations had been facing. It suffered from chronic financial problems. Consequently, the company decided to give up the different schemes that existed in the country and turn them over to private companies. NATCO handed a number of schemes to private companies.

The Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme has also been privatised. Two members from the scheme management in Kaoma the project manager, the assistant project manager, one family farmer, and three ex-members from NATCO(head office) a general manager, an executive chairman and operations manager together formed a company under the name WESTCO (Western Tobacco Company) in 1992. The property of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme is still under the auspices of NATCO. The total take-over will only be accomplished if WESTCO covers all debts and the salaries paid to ex-NATCO staff members.

Buildings, field equipment (i.e. tractors, baling boxes, scales, etc.) are still the property of NATCO but they are available for hire to WESTCO at commercial rates. Currently WESTCO has 15 staff members. The company is not able to pay the salaries for its workers, let alone to run the scheme. The workers have not been paid from September 1993 up to the time when the researcher left the area at the end of January 1994. Neither the scheme nor the farmers are growing tobacco for the 1993\94 crop season, for the first time in the history of the scheme since 1971.


We shall try to summarise the reasons for the decline of arrangements of the TBZ as follows:

- a) The government decided to allow or continue replacement of TBZ, even when those institutions which replaced TBZ did not function better, and even went worse, followed by a severe decrease in production of tobacco, and poorer management;
- b) Managers were appointed on political grounds, placing people in positions without experience and the necessary knowledge of the production scheme. A trainer at the agricultural college in Popota had no knowledge of tobacco while he was recruited as an expert from England (Nelson-Richards 1988:34);
- c) Lone recovery was poor, mostly as a result of lack of know-how and of proper training about the essence of loans;
- d) The lower number of tractors and machinery in the scheme created a situation whereby farmers failed to go for a larger hectareage;
- e) Farmers failed to develop their farms more because they were denied proper title deeds;
- f) There was a lack of marketing, late payment for produce, bad transport facilities during peak periods of harvest, and storage problems. In addition, the prices that the government imposed left farmers with low or no profit at all.

The following table and graph on the next page shows the production of tobacco since 1973 under various institutions. We have also looked for the production of maize for the same years but, unfortunately, the necessary documents were not available, neither in Kaoma nor in Lusaka.

Table 7.
Tobacco production during Tobacco Board of Zambia and other institutions which later replaced TBZ.

Tobacco production under various institutions	Production year	Production in kilogram
Tobacco Board of Zambia	1973	12760
	1974	20080
	1975	96000
	1976	122727
	1977	155964
	1978	135784
	1979	283639
	1980	109137
	Department of Agriculture	1981
1982		85000
1983		124000
Gebruder [check] Koln [check] [check] Kampf	1984	17000
Department of Agriculture	1985	50000
	1986	97299
National Tobacco Company	1987	100240
	1988	84233
	1989	54333
	1990	81012
	1991	77000
Western Tobacco Company	1992	64000
	1993	(no tobacco production)



reserved for the scheme map

VIII. Summary and Conclusion

Zambia's efforts to develop the rural areas in the first years of independence were very limited as compared to development efforts for the urban areas. The neglect of the agricultural sector in development priorities had to do with the fact that Zambia put great emphasis to rapid industrialisation. The country focused its attention on copper. The general economic situation of the country (the declining state of the economy) with the fall of the price of copper and the decline of the mining sector, caused a change in policy to develop the agricultural sector as a source of foreign exchange, government revenue, and employment.

Various development schemes have been erected throughout the country, among others, a tobacco scheme in Kaoma district in 1971. After the nose-dive of the price of copper, Zambia aimed to increase exportable crops so as to replace copper. The development strategies of the period after independence, which were characterised by an increased state involvement in the economy, the expansion of free social services, and subsidies to consumers, are now under pressure and a liberalisation towards a more free-market approach is under way.

The efforts to raise the productivity of the rural economy, (the agricultural sector) are still problematic. The success or failure of such efforts to transform traditional agriculture will depend not only on the farmers' ability and skill in raising productivity but also on social, commercial, and institutional conditions under which the farmers function. Inadequate technical know-how, managerial capabilities and resource management are the root of the problems.

The absence of a clear theoretical and analytical framework makes it difficult to foster an economically and socially sound and meaningful form of development. It might be useful to understand the multiple dimensions of development, to be more flexible and to allow a diversity of approaches in developing strategies. In discussing economic growth and rural development, it will also be necessary to recognise the social networks and ties of rural communities. In order to conceptualise the goal of development for these communities, it is also essential to rethink the issue of knowledge, authority, and the issue of power.

Policy design, mainly based on local situations, is also needed. Local knowledge can produce alternatives by connecting local or traditional skills with modern skills. Communities reshape and reconstitute their own world upon the norms and values of their locality. In realising the issue of development, it is therefore very difficult to intervene simply without unknowing of the local context. Cernea (1987:36) suggests the following: '... financial resources are not necessarily the key ingredients in all development programmes. The range of entrance points for sociological knowledge and skills should be expanded to all segments of development planning, from policy making to execution and evaluation ...'

Various schemes have been erected to extend marketing facilities, to provide rural credit, to mechanise agriculture, to build co-operatives. All these efforts by the Zambian government have barely helped to improve the economic situation of the country, especially for the vast majority who live in the rural areas. The producer co-operative movement, which was an attempt to increase agricultural outputs and raise the productivity of the poor farmers in the rural areas, has failed to meet its objectives. The reason for the failure was that the programme was poorly planned and poorly executed. The agricultural credit organisations were not able to recover the money they had lent. The monopoly power of the state, in setting agriculture produce prices hindered many farmers to expand their lands as the price was not favourable enough to motivate them.

The consequences of the plans and policy decisions that constituted Zambia's agricultural development strategy have affected people's lives in a concrete and real way. The establishment of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme in Western Province did not achieve its primary goals. The standard of living of the large majority of the indigenous people in the area has hardly improved. In real terms one can even argue that the standard of living of this group has fallen during the last two decades. Almost nothing has been done to improve the transportation network in the outlying areas. The lack of meaningful development and job creation in the rural areas has aggravated the problem.

Despite the shortcomings of the development plans and their implementations, one can not dismiss the fact that there have been improvements in the area, especially in Nkeyema and Kaoma rural towns and

the surrounding villages. As we have already discussed in this thesis the agricultural transformation had positive and negative effects for the native people in the area. The positive side of the story is that the cash crop economy has created new opportunities and this in turn has led to the decline of the levelling mechanisms of the traditional village economy. Large numbers of young villagers have sought to take advantage of the expanded opportunities for wealth in the district and have hired themselves as casual workers in the tobacco scheme and to individual farmers. The young people prefer to go to the towns rather than stay in their village. In the towns they get assistance from relatives and friends. Those villagers who are too old or too young or too poorly educated remain in the village. (see also Todaro 1989 pp. 276-279). Many young people are being blamed by the elders in the village of being lazy and disobedient. Social habits of urban people have entered the villages. Young villagers prefer to smoke cigarettes, drink bottled beer and having watches, radios and bicycles. As the number of inhabitants increases in the Nkeyema area so does the number of institutions. The presence of several churches in Nkeyema area are having a great influence on the traditional beliefs and ritual practices. The number of primary and junior high schools has more than doubled since the erection of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme in 1971 and trade and business have expanded.

The negative results of the introduction of modern agriculture can be explained as follows: The beneficiaries of the development project were those who actively participated in the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme as farmers, those who engaged in local business and of course those highly paid officials of the tobacco scheme itself. Since the erection of the tobacco scheme, the gaps between the rich and the poor has grown steadily. A class situation has been created. The differentiation of the inhabitants of Nkeyema and the surrounding peasants was a direct consequence of TBZ or the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme. Nkoya participation was very limited except for those very few who were already better-off and were relatives of the royal family. The recruitment of the family farmers by the scheme also favoured other ethnic groups over the native villagers. The Nkoya's participation in the scheme came late.

The scheme did not spend much time to teach and convince the traditional farmers to let them participate in modern agriculture. The family farmers from other ethnic groups did not appear to have a better knowledge of modern agriculture and the use of modern supplies. The recruitment itself was not selective and the family farmers did not receive proper training. There was rarely any communication between the scheme and the family farmers. The farmers would have increased their motivation and consequently their production if they knew the reasons behind the decisions that affected them. This lack of communication finally led to the disruption of agricultural work and the failure to achieve the scheme's objectives.

More individual men were recruited as opposed to settler families. Recruitment was not linked to considerations such as the type of the production system, the type of community, and the type of society that was desired. This was most probably one of the reasons for the final failure of the scheme. Scudder (1986: 132) writes: '...there are two overwhelming advantages to recruiting settlers from villages in the same local and ethnic area instead of from different ethnic areas. First, neighbours and co-ethnics [**check**] are much more likely than strangers to form self-help groups for land clearing and house building during the early years of settlement. Second, the potential stress and uncertainty adapting to new neighbours is lessened when neighbours come from a similar background...'

One would assume that through development and modernisation peasant participation in local and state affairs would increase and that communal and ethnical conflicts would disappear. But it may, on the other hand, harden ethnic identities, provoke or intensify conflict on the basis of culture and economic and power differences. Naturally, such issues have to be deliberately phrased in terms of what will happen, so as to raise questions about the determination of the outcomes of policy designs.

The case of the Kaoma-Nkeyema tobacco scheme is not unique. Several large-scale production organisations in many developing countries during the last half century have shown that they did not provide better prospects (Ellis 1992) for efficient and innovative farm production than do freehold or leasehold farms. Organisational arrangements are often dependent up on technologies and infrastructures (for example telephones, roads, radio communications) to facilitate mobility and communication; and these are scarce in many developing countries and especially in the rural areas.

Access to agricultural inputs is not in itself enough, and above all, access to resources does not automatically lead to and make a successful farmer. Tsetse infestation and the lack of a tradition of oxen cultivation are further constraints which are crucial in preventing farmers from considerably

expanding their cultivation and surplus production. Basic modern agricultural skills are often lacking. Most of the indigenous people are illiterate. The farmers training centre in Nkeyema and the programme of the agricultural extension service are such that they only favour farmers who are already better-off. At least a basic education is necessary for the traditional farmers before they can get access to and use agricultural inputs: a basic knowledge of arithmetic is necessary in order to apply fertiliser.

The problem of raising the productivity of the rural economy can be tackled by raising the amount of money, and better training and organisation. The whole process can be assisted if there is a background of progressive education, health and general living conditions, which all call for capital expenditures. The traditional farmers, unable to expand their agricultural output in competition with the rich farmers in the area, inevitably find themselves squeezed out.

A fundamental restructuring of the socio-political situation in the province is essential to end the continuing socio-economic problems and the escalating ethnic conflicts in the area. Normally, the state should ideally represent all groups in the society and resolve differences between those groups in the general interest. But reality is different. Certain groups maintain better accesses to the state than others. Not only are the poor and the minorities disadvantaged in their political and economic participation, but systematic efforts are made by dominant groups to fragment and control the dominated people. We have made this clear when discussing the Nkoya-Lozi relationship. The Nkoya are outnumbered by other ethnic groups in their own region. The big majority of the inhabitants both in Nkeyema and Kaoma town are immigrants from the province and from other parts of the country. The majority of the Nkoya live in outlying areas and still continue to lead subsistence lives. The Nkoya people are still dominated by the Lozi, who are both politically as well as economically dominant in Western Province. The central government in Lusaka has not yet taken any measures to improve the political domination of the one ethnic group by the other. The political system is open to abuse in the forms of nepotism, patronage and the like and these dangers seem to exist even in the current multi-party state.

The tragedy of the present collapse of Zambia's economy is that it has hit the vast majority of the people in the country. In his concluding remarks, van Donge (1980) described the problems in Zambia as follows: '... if one listens at the grass roots, one hears different questions: of course the copper price has collapsed, of course we suffered from the war in South Africa, of course we are exploited by foreigners, but there must be more to the tragedies that beset Zambia..?' Not only Zambia but all the front line states have suffered from the apartheid regime in South Africa. Zimbabwe and Namibia have now become independent and South Africa has abolished apartheid and has become a democratic and multi-racial state, and finally Zambia has become a multi-party state in 1991. In the recent multi-party democracy, there is a sign of improvement as compared to the former one-party state. There is freedom of press, openness and as far as I know there are no political prisoners in the country. Ethnical issues are discussed openly on a national level and this may pave the way for self-determination and the recognition of minorities and other dominated ethnic groups.¹⁶⁾

The economic situation in the country has not yet shown any development. Partly as a result of the structural adjustment programmes and partly because of the failure of fully implementing the agrarian policy in general, the socio-economic problems (food shortages, unemployment, crime) are noticeable. These socio-economic issues are unlikely to be resolved soon, unless the government quickly takes correcting measures to allow and stimulate private agricultural enterprise and implements policies aimed at attracting new private investment in the agricultural sector to expand it. Accessibility to import/export licences for agricultural produce can enhance competitiveness. The government's programme to restructure the agricultural sector should also include the improvement of agricultural extension services and ensure the availability of agricultural inputs to producers as well as revitalising credit delivery, research, storage capacity and other support services.

Notes

1. Application written to the former President of the Republic of Zambia, 12 March 1990. By Chief Kahare and Chief Mutondo.
2. Discussion with the Secretary of Chief Kahare, Mr, Davison Kawanga.
3. Times of Zambia. July 10, 1993.
4. Zambia Daily Mail April 30, 1993.
5. Sunday Mail, June 20, 1993.*
6. Sunday Mail December 1, 1993. *
7. The African Jigsaw, March 1992, no. 53.
8. The Weekly Post, November 11, 1993 & November 23, 1993. **
9. The African Jigsaw, July 1992, no. 54.
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